The Lazy Lion obtained its supply of marijuana from a series of grow operations which cultivated and prepared the marijuana for distribution at various warehouses located in the Colorado Springs area. Poarch and his wife owned and controlled the growing operations. Once the marijuana was received at The Lazy Lion, customers could enter the business, purchase marijuana, and if desired, consume the marijuana on the premises.The Lazy Lion was a cash only business. The Lazy Lion maintained an ATM within the dispensary, which allowed members to obtain cash within the premises.The Lazy Lion generated substantial profits during the course of its operations. In order to track its cash revenues, the company used a point of sale program that recorded the receipt of all cash funds collected from customers at the business. Records from the point of sale system were collected and analyzed during the investigation of the business and it was determined that during the period of the scheme, the gross revenues for the business approximated $10,792,320. Federal agents then determined the business expenses and the income.On or about September 29, 2015, Poarch and his wife signed a Form 1040, Individual Income Tax Return, signed under penalties of perjury, and represented that, to the best of their knowledge, the information contained in the return was true, correct, and complete. Among other information, the 2014 tax return stated that their adjusted gross income was $19,294 and that they were due a refund from the IRS. In fact, Poarch was aware that their adjusted gross income was approximately $2,807,761 and the couple owed the IRS tax of $1,061,485.The parties failed to file personal income tax returns for the 2015 and 2016 tax years. Their net income for the 2015 tax year was $4,187,449. Their net income for the 2016 tax year was $1,325,575.As a result of the conduct, Poarch and his wife failed to pay the IRS a total of $3,126,245 in taxes due and owing.
Gladius self-reported to the SEC's Enforcement staff in the summer of 2018, expressed an interest in taking prompt remedial steps, and cooperated with the investigation. The SEC did not impose a penalty because the company self-reported the conduct, agreed to compensate investors, and will register the tokens as a class of securities. The case follows the Commission's two recent ICO registration cases, in which companies agreed to pay penalties for similar registration violations and agreed to similar undertakings.
According to the most recent figures from Ralph Janvey, the court-appointed receiver rounding up funds for the victims, about $500 million of the roughly $5 billion in investor losses had been recovered as of Oct. 31, 2018. Out of that, a court has approved about $224 million in fees and expenses for Janvey and his team. That leaves about $275 million - or about five cents on the dollar - for the victims.. . .Even if all of Janvey's efforts are successful, Stanford's investors are likely to receive only pennies on the dollar, while Madoff investors have recovered about 75 cents on the dollar in principal - and counting. Sadler said the difference is the result of different treatment of the two frauds by the agencies that normally look out for investors."Sadly, unlike in the Madoff case, Stanford investors were not eligible for SIPC coverage for their losses," Sadler told CNBC in an email. He was referring to the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, which compensates investors for securities and cash that are lost when a brokerage firm fails.In the case of Madoff, SIPC oversaw the liquidation of the firm, made payments to thousands of investors, and covered the fees of court-appointed trustee Irving Picard. But in the case of Stanford, whose U.S. brokerage arm was a SIPC member, the agency argued that the securities in question - bogus CDs issued by a foreign bank - were not covered under the law. Thus, neither were the victims. . . .
From August 2014 through April 2017, Rivas violated the duties of confidentiality he owed to the Investment Bank by serially misappropriating material, nonpublic information from the Investment Bank's Deal Tracking System and passing that information along to friends so that they could utilize it to make profitable trades. On more than 50 occasions between August 2014 and April 2017, Rivas provided Inside Information about contemplated but unannounced merger and acquisition transactions and tender offer transactions involving clients and prospective clients of the Investment Bank to friends who used that information to purchase and sell securities. In total, the insider trading based on Inside Information misappropriated by Rivas resulted in illicit profits of more than $5 million through trading in more than two dozen securities. The Inside Information was passed through three tipping chains.
Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. At the time of Timbs's arrest, the police seized a Land Rover SUV Timbs had purchased for $42,000 with money he received from an insurance policy when his father died. The State sought civil forfeiture of Timbs's vehicle, charging that the SUV had been used to transport heroin. Observing that Timbs had recently purchased the vehicle for more than four times the maximum $10,000 monetary fine assessable against him for his drug conviction, the trial court denied the State's request. The vehicle's forfeiture, the court determined, would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs's offense, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause constrains only federal action and is inapplicable to state impositions.Held: The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Pp. 2-9.(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates and renders applicable to the States Bill of Rights protections "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty," or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 767 (alterations omitted). If a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires. Pp. 2-3.(b) The prohibition embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause carries forward protections found in sources from Magna Carta to the English Bill of Rights to state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. Protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history for good reason: Such fines undermine other liberties. They can be used, e.g., to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies. They can also be employed, not in service of penal purposes, but as a source of revenue. The historical and logical case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is indeed overwhelming. Pp. 3-7.(c) Indiana argues that the Clause does not apply to its use of civil in rem forfeitures, but this Court held in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, that such forfeitures fall within the Clause's protection when they are at least partially punitive. Indiana cannot prevail unless the Court overrules Austin or holds that, in light of Austin, the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated because its application to civil in rem forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted.The first argument, overturning Austin, is not properly before this Court. The Indiana Supreme Court held only that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to the States. The court did not address the Clause's application to civil in rem forfeitures, nor did the State ask it to do so. Timbs thus sought this Court's review only of the question whether the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Indiana attempted to reformulate the question to ask whether the Clause restricted States' use of civil in rem forfeitures and argued on the merits that Austin was wrongly decided. Respondents' "right, . . . to restate the questions presented," however, "does not give them the power to expand [those] questions," Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 279, n. 10 (emphasis deleted), particularly where the proposed reformulation would lead the Court to address a question neither pressed nor passed upon below, cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7.The second argument, that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures, misapprehends the nature of the incorporation inquiry. In considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a Bill of Rights protection, this Court asks whether the right guaranteed-not each and every particular application of that right-is fundamental or deeply rooted. To suggest otherwise is inconsistent with the approach taken in cases concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. ___, ___. The Excessive Fines Clause is thus incorporated regardless of whether application of the Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted. Pp. 7-9.84 N. E. 3d 1179, vacated and remanded.