Upon execution of this Agreement and receipt of your can sell date from Edward Jones, you will be a financial advisor of Edward Jones. If, within three (3) years after receipt of your can sell date, your employment with Edward Jones is terminated by you or by Edward Jones, you maintain registration of your license with FINRA and accept employment with any entity as either an employee or independent contractor engaged in the sale of securities and/or insurance business, you agree to reimburse Edward Jones the reasonable cost of the training Edward Jones has provided you including, but not limited to, the cost of the selection and hiring. * * * You agree that the reimbursable amount bears a reasonable relationship to the computed damages Edward Jones would suffer from a breach by you and that Edward Jones will suffer demonstrable loss as a result of your breach. The amount you agree to reimburse Edward Jones is $ 75,000.00. There shall be no reduction in the amount of training costs owed by you in the event your employment is terminated during the first year of service as a financial advisor of Edward Jones. This obligation shall be reduced by $ 9,375.00 for each full quarter year of service beginning the thirteenth month of your employment as a financial advisor of Edward Jones. You must be employed by Edward Jones for each full quarter year in order to have your training cost obligation reduced according to the provisions of this paragraph.  

Plaintiffs Wayne Bland, Danuta Durkiewicz, David Bowles, and Adam Reyes ("Plaintiffs") filed this putative collective and class action against Defendants Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. and The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P.; alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Count I) and several Illinois and Missouri state laws. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss [83] Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint [79]. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss [83] is granted in part and denied in part. The case is set for further status on May 13, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel are directed to file a joint status report, including a discovery plan and a statement of whether any settlement talks have occurred and whether the parties request an early settlement conference, no later than May 8, 2020. 

1. Edward Jones recruits new trainee brokers, called Financial Advisor ("FA") Trainees, with promises of extensive training and high pay. However, the Firm provides no meaningful training and denies FA Trainees the minimum and overtime wages required by federal and state law. Upon hiring, Edward Jones forces all FA Trainees to sign unlawful contracts agreeing to pay up to $75,000 in so-called "training costs" if they leave the Firm for any reason, as most will be forced to do, but continue selling securities or insurance products within three years after the Firm deems they "can sell." Edward Jones knows that a majority of the FA Trainees it recruits will not survive the three-year "training cost" period, but does not disclose this to its new hires. FA Trainees not directly fired are forced out by the Firm's high pressure sales requirements and diminishing pay scale, intentionally designed to force advisors to sell or leave, while Edward Jones retains the clients, assets, and fees the FA Trainees have developed for the Firm.¹ 

2. The Firm's limited training consists largely of high pressure sales tactics and a directive to sell to clients the financial products of "preferred product partners," who kick back a portion of their (often high) fees to the Firm. FA Trainees who resist Edward Jones's pressure to push these products on their clients in order to boost the Firm's revenues typically find themselves unable to meet their production goals and are forced out of the Firm. 

3. As a result, and by design, most FA Trainees will owe Edward Jones a significant portion of their pay as so-called "training costs," despite having received no meaningful training. Armed with the leverage and threat of substantial "training costs" debt if they leave, Edward Jones forces FA Trainees to work long hours, fails properly to record or pay them for hours and overtime worked, and misclassifies FA Trainees as exempt from overtime requirements after the initial training period. 

4. Edward Jones's practice of forcing FA Trainees to pay purported training costs and intentionally denying them minimum wages and overtime compensation violates federal and state wage and hour laws, including by failing to pay wages "free and clear. On behalf of themselves and other Edward Jones FA Trainees, Plaintiffs seek an end to Defendants' unlawful practices and fair relief for class members.  

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Footnote 1: As used herein, "FA Trainees" includes Edward Jones financial advisors from hire date through the three-year "training cost" period. 

Ultimately, the Investigations Group discovered that Uwasomba had been convicted of petit larceny in the Chesterfield Circuit Court in Virginia in February 2008 and received a sentence of 12 months and 4 days in jail, with 12 months suspended. (Linville Dec. ¶ 5.) Based on this discovery, Uwasomba's background check was deemed unsatisfactory. (Id.) On December 7, 2016, the Investigations Group sent Uwasomba a letter informing her of the results of her background check. (12/07/2016 Letter, ECF No. 7.) 

Merrill Lynch provided Uwasomba with an opportunity to contest the background check determination. The December 7, 2016 letter informed Uwasomba that she could submit additional information within seven days to clarify or correct the results of the investigation. (Id.) Uwasomba's case was subsequently assigned to Appeals Manager Angela Linville. (Linville Decl. ¶ 9.) Linville contacted Uwasomba and informed her that FINRA rules precluded her from working as a Preferred Transition Specialist Trainee. (Id. ¶ 10.) Linville further explained that Uwasomba would be disqualified from any position at Merrill Lynch unless she could demonstrate that she met the de minimis exception under the FDIA; in other words, that she spent three days or fewer in jail. (Id. ¶ 11.) In an effort to prove that she had served fewer than four days in jail, Uwasomba visited the Chesterfield Circuit Court in Virginia to obtain records related to her incarceration. (Pl.'s Dep. 188:4-12.) The Court records indicated exactly what the background investigation had uncovered: that Uwasomba had served four days in prison for petit larceny. (Id. 188:19-189:17.) Uwasomba ultimately did not submit to Merrill Lynch or Linville any documents relevant to her conviction and sentence. (Pl.'s Dep. 189:2-9.)

[U]wasomba's case rests entirely on one vague statement about "Nigerians and fraud" which she cannot precisely recollect. Furthermore, the alleged statement was made by an individual who had no authority to hire her. Quite simply, she has failed to present direct evidence of discrimination related to an individual with authority to hire or fire her. Finally, she has not presented any evidence that she is qualified to work in any capacity for Merrill Lynch. Accordingly, Summary Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Merrill Lynch.