Securities Industry Commentator by Bill Singer Esq

After Morgan Stanley Raised Serious Questions in Failed TRO Against Former Employee, The Parties Stipulate to Preliminary Injunction (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog)

Attorney General James Directs Unregistered Crypto Lending Platforms to Cease Operations In New York, Announces Additional Investigations / Today's Announcement Follows Previous Warnings to Virtual Currency Platforms That Unlawful Activity Will Not Be Tolerated in New York (NYAG Release)

SEC Staff Releases Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in Early 2021(SEC Release)

Statement on Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in Early 2021 by Chair Gary Gensler

Statement on Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Conditions in Early 2021 by SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce and Commissioner Elad L. Roisman

Enhancing Equity Market Competition (Speech by SEC Commissioner Elad L. Roisman)

FINRA Fines and Suspends Rep for Removing and Retaining Customer Information

In the Matter of Robert Frederick Geiler, Respondent (FINRA AWC)

Federal Circuit Court Sustains Registered Rep's Conviction and Sentence of 90 Months (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog)

The nature and function of the most common virtual currency lending products or services demonstrate that they fall squarely within any of several categories of "security" under the Martin Act.

The virtual currency lending products at issue in today's actions promise a fixed or variable rate of return to investors, and claim to deliver those returns by, among other things, trading with, or further lending those virtual assets. The most common virtual currency lending products or services are therefore securities under the Martin Act, including, in particular, those that accept virtual currencies in exchange for a rate of return. As a result, entities offering such products from New York or to New Yorkers must be registered with the OAG as brokers, dealers, or salespersons, unless exempted.

In 2021, the OAG's Investor Protection Bureau continued the modernization of its registration operations, and updated its commodities personnel registration forms to collect information regarding virtual currencies. In March 2021, the OAG specifically notified the industry that those dealing in virtual currencies directly (such as trading platforms) must register with the Investor Protection Bureau, unless exempted.

In the past, Attorney General James has not hesitated to hold cryptocurrency trading platforms and token issuers accountable. Just last month, Attorney General James shut down the  cryptocurrency trading platform Coinseed, Inc. after she filed a lawsuit against the company earlier this year.

On that same day last month, Attorney General James secured a recovery of nearly half a billion dollars unlawfully obtained from investors who financially backed GTV Media Group, Inc. and its parent company, Saraca Media Group, Inc. In addition to unlawfully selling stocks, the company was selling two digital instruments promoted as cryptocurrencies without registering in New York state.

In February, Attorney General James announced an agreement with Bitfinex, Tether, and related entities that ended all of their trading activity in the state of New York, imposed an $18.5 million penalty on the companies, and increased transparency.

The meme stocks experienced a dramatic increase in their share price in January 2021 as bullish sentiments of individual investors filled social media. As the companies' share prices skyrocketed to new highs, increased attention followed, and their shares became known as "meme stocks." Then, as the end of January approached, several retail broker-dealers temporarily prohibited certain activity in some of these stocks and options. GME experienced a confluence of all of the factors that impacted the meme stocks: (1) large price moves, (2) large volume changes, (3) large short interest, (4) frequent Reddit mentions, and (5) significant coverage in the mainstream media.

The Report concludes with the staff identifying areas of market structure and our regulatory framework for potential study and additional consideration. These include:

1. Forces that may cause a brokerage to restrict trading;
2. Digital engagement practices and payment for order flow;
3. Trading in dark pools and wholesalers; and
4. The market dynamics of short selling.

Today, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission published a report on the "meme stock" events of winter 2021, and how these events affected individual investors. These meme stocks, including but not limited to GameStop, exhibited significant price volatility, trading volume, and attention in the markets in January.

January's events gave us an opportunity to consider how we can further our efforts to make the equity markets as fair, orderly, and efficient as possible. Making markets work for everyday investors gets to the heart of the SEC's mission.

In the report, staff raised a number of issues for additional consideration, including:  

• Events that may cause a brokerage to restrict trading, as well as matters related to clearing and settling.
• The use of digital engagement practices (DEPs), including predictive data analytics, differential marketing, and behavioral prompts.[1]
• Equity market structure and incentives, as well as the role of dark pools and wholesalers.
• The transparency and related market dynamics of short selling.

Today, the staff issued a report on the so called "meme stock" episode that occurred this past January.  We would like to thank the staff not only for their hard work on this report, but also for keeping the Commission fully and timely informed during the period of extreme volatility discussed in the report.  While the report includes an interesting account of the events, it does not appear that many conclusions can be drawn from the data.  This report should have been an anodyne report on the events of earlier this year and, if evident from the data, an assessment of the causes of those events.  Surprisingly, the report turned into an account of those events awkwardly intertwined with discussions of market practices and policies that mirror Commission-level conversations unrelated to the specifics of January's events.  Including these discussions distracts rather than informs our understanding of the meme stock episode.

In the wake of an anomalous market event, it can be tempting to identify a convenient scapegoat and leverage the event to pursue regulatory actions without regard to the factual record.  The report, however, finds no causal connection between the meme stock volatility and conflicts of interest, payment for order flow, off-exchange trading, wholesale market-making, or any other market practice that has drawn recent popular attention.  Indeed, in our discussions about causes of the January episode, whether with staff or with market participants, we have seen no evidence that these practices were a cause of these events.

After the public has had a chance to consider the report, we look forward to a robust policy discussion.  The rules governing the equity market are akin to the woven threads on a sweater.[1]  Pulling too tightly on one thread typically loosens another, often in unintended and damaging ways.  A full and fair consideration of both the operation of our complex equity market and previous Commission actions is critical to avoid pulling too tightly on the wrong thread. 

For example, a discussion about payment for order flow must consider the cost savings it provides to retail investors as well as the regulatory regime we have in place to address potential conflicts.[2]  Past Commission and staff statements acknowledged the many benefits wholesalers can provide to retail investors.[3]  We should not neglect to do so in our current analyses of market structure.  And finally, consideration of changes must take into account rulemakings that we have finalized recently.  For instance, as acknowledged in the report's otherwise odd discussion of the National 'Best' Bid or Offer, less than one year ago, the Commission took steps to narrow quoted spreads and require the display of better priced odd-lot quotations as a means to, among other things, improve the NBBO and promote best execution of retail investor orders.[4]

We always should be on the lookout for ways to improve our rules and our markets, but we must move with the utmost care to ensure we do not harm investors and impair markets that are integral to people's lives and retirement, as well as the U.S. economy.  Investors and issuers, whom the equity market is after all here to serve, deserve nothing less.  

   

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[1] See Elad L. Roisman, Remarks at the SIFMA Equity Market Structure Conference: The Dynamics of our Markets and the Changing Structure on which they are Built (Sept. 19, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-remarks-sifma-equity-market-structure-conference-091919; Elad L. Roisman, Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (June 10, 2021), available at SEC.gov | Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting.

[2] See, e.g., Payment for Order Flow, Final Rules, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34902 (Oct. 27, 1994), 59 FR 55006, 55009 (Nov. 2, 1994); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 84528 (Nov. 2, 2018), 83 FR 58338, 58374-76 (Nov. 19, 2018); and Division of Trading Markets, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 606 of Regulation NMS, Issue 14: Arrangements Affecting Execution Quality at a Venue available at https://www.sec.gov/tm/faq-rule-606-regulation-nms.

[3] See, e.g., Staff Report on Algorithmic Trading in the U.S. Capital Markets (Aug. 5, 2020), 31, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/Algo_Trading_Report_2020.pdf; and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90610 (Dec. 9, 2020), 86 FR 18596, 18747 (Apr. 9, 2021).

[4] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90610 (Dec. 9, 2020), 86 FR 18596, 18611-20 (Apr. 9, 2021).

[1]Thank you, Rich [Repetto] for that kind introduction.  Before I begin, let me give my standard disclaimer that the views I express today are my own and do not represent those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

It's great to be with you to discuss equity market structure, an area I am particularly passionate about.  The U.S. equity market serves a vital function for both issuers and investors.  A vibrant equity market can reduce the cost of capital for companies and help investors grow their savings to provide for their families and save for retirement.  Retail investors can do this directly through broker-dealers or indirectly through pooled vehicles such as mutual funds.  The challenge for the Commission in continually seeking to optimize equity market structure is to strive for outcomes that further the important interests of two constituencies: investors, namely retail investors and institutional investors that are effectively pooled retail, and issuers.

Over the last few years, we have seen an increase in the number of retail investors participating directly in our equity market.  This a welcome development.  However, this increased retail participation has also led to much discussion about certain market structure topics related to off-exchange trading.  Today, I would like to share my views with you on some of these important issues including payment for order flow, best execution, execution quality measurements, and the effect of off-exchange trading on public price discovery. 

Importantly, I also plan to highlight several actions the Commission has taken over the last three years to enhance competition in ways that bear directly on these matters.  I am glad to have had the opportunity to contribute to these initiatives.  It is through the continued promotion of competition that the Commission is best able to pursue equity market structure policy that furthers the interests of issuers and investors of all types.

Payment for Order Flow

Let's start with payment for order flow.  In the wake of the meme stock volatility this past January, we started hearing renewed calls for the Commission to address payment for order flow.  I must admit I am a bit perplexed at this since I have not seen any evidence of a connection between the meme stock episode and payment for order flow.  The amount of vitriol against payment for order flow reminds me of the old Washington adage: never let a crisis go to waste.  In any event, critics suggest that the SEC must regulate payment for order flow to deal with the conflict of interest it poses. 

However, the fact is we already regulate payment for order flow.  Our regulatory approach features two key aspects specifically designed to address the potential conflict of interest.  The first is best execution.  The Commission has long stated that a broker-dealer must not let payment for order flow interfere with its efforts to obtain best execution.[2]  In other words, brokers must make sure their customers are getting the most favorable terms reasonably available notwithstanding the receipt of payment for order flow.[3]  This alone is an important tool in mitigating any potential conflict associated with payment for order flow.

Second, we have a comprehensive disclosure regime under Rule 606 of Reg NMS.  The Commission updated this rule just three years ago in order to increase the information broker-dealers publicly disclose about payment for order flow.[4]  Amended Rule 606 requires brokers to disclose both the amount of payment for order flow received from certain venues as well as a description of any term of a payment for order flow arrangement that may influence a routing decision.[5]  We have provided a lot of guidance on what should be disclosed on 606 reports (people should look at footnote 397 of the release).[6]  Suffice it to say, "any term" means any term.  Rule 606, as amended, reflects the Commission's historical preference for utilizing public disclosure as a key tool in addressing potential conflicts.[7]  I believe this is an important and, unfortunately, overlooked requirement in the current discussion on payment for order flow.

While I do not mean to suggest that a discussion of payment for order flow is unwarranted, I am concerned both with linking that discussion to the events of this past January and also not considering the broader context of the Commission's existing regulatory approach.

Promoting Execution Quality

This is not to say that there is not more the Commission can do to enhance competition as a means to facilitate best execution.  I have previously stated that the Commission should consider enhancing the monthly execution quality reports issued by market centers pursuant to Rule 605.[8]  These reports are supposed to assist brokers in fulfilling their best execution obligations by providing standardized assessments of execution quality.[9]  Rule 605 reports also promote competition among market centers on the basis of execution quality which can in turn lead to more efficient transactions for investors.[10]  However, Rule 605 has not been updated in twenty years, during which time the equity market has undergone tremendous evolution.  As a general matter, it is critical that we routinely review existing rules to keep pace with both changes in the market and changes of our own doing.

Potential enhancements to 605 reports could include refining certain data elements as well as adding new elements and metrics, including those that may be most relevant for institutional investors.  For example, more granular execution speed buckets may be appropriate in an era of sub-second execution.  Similarly, changes to the order size buckets would seem to be appropriate.  Consider that current Rule 605 reports do not even capture certain round lots under the Commission's new definition of a round lot for stocks over $250.[11]  These and other new metrics all seem to be worthy of consideration and work. 

In this regard, I have also stated that it may be worth developing a separate execution quality report to be issued monthly by retail brokers.[12]  One means by which we could foster competition for the execution of marketable retail orders is by facilitating robust competition among retail brokers on the basis of execution quality.  However, there is currently no standardized approach by which retail brokers can compete on an apples-to-apples basis.

The original premise behind Rule 605 was that it would work hand-in-hand with Rule 606 so that a customer would be able to see both the venues to which its broker sent orders and the level of execution quality the customer could generally expect to receive from those venues.[13]  While I think this logic holds, it would also benefit customers to see the execution quality their broker actually received at each venue identified on its Rule 606 reports.  This could go a long way to further promote competition for retail orders.

Operational Transparency

We should also consider the state of competition among different types of markets and assess the extent to which there is a level playing field.  A strength of our equity market is vigorous competition between different types of market centers.  Each day sixteen national securities exchanges, over thirty alternative trading systems ("ATSs"), and many more broker-dealers compete to execute investor orders.[14]  Competition among markets is important because a dominant market could utilize its market position to exert pricing pressure on investors.  I believe our regulatory framework has been successful in promoting competition to prevent such an occurrence.

Nevertheless, we should continually assess whether regulating different types of market centers in a disparate manner makes sense in light of current market conditions.  For example, exchanges and ATSs are required to provide public disclosures of their operations through either rulebooks, for exchanges, or Form ATS-N for ATSs.[15]  However, off-exchange market makers do not have an obligation to provide transparency into their operations.  While many such firms provide voluntary disclosures on their websites, I believe it would promote competition among markets to require certain off-exchange market makers to provide public transparency in a uniform manner on their operations.  I have personally heard from market participants that they have benefited from the disclosures on Form ATS-N.  I believe similar disclosures for off-exchange market makers would likewise be beneficial.

Public Price Discovery

The last area I'd like to highlight is the effect of off-exchange trading on public price discovery, which is a decades-old question that has recently been receiving renewed attention.  But it is absolutely a very important question as it goes to one of the key functions of a market. 

I believe that any honest conversation on this topic must begin by acknowledging the important steps the Commission unanimously took less than one year ago to narrow quoted spreads and require the display of better priced odd-lot quotations.[16]  These reforms are designed to greatly improve the public price discovery process and are worth spending some time on. 

The Commission chose to define the amount of shares necessary to constitute a round lot based on a stock's share price.[17]  In other words, as a stock's price increases, the number of shares necessary to constitute a round lot decreases.  This is important because under our rules, a bid or offer must be for at least a round lot in order to constitute a market's best quote and thereby receive price protection and potentially comprise the NBBO.[18]  The Commission decreased the notional amount required to set the best displayed price as means to, among things, narrow spreads, particularly in high priced stocks, which not only facilitates better price discovery, but lowers transaction costs for all investors, and fosters competition by better encouraging the display of limit orders.[19] 

The adopted round lot tiers were based on a robust data analysis that sought to strike a balance between capturing a substantial portion of better priced odd-lots while ensuring, as the Commission stated, that "additional orders of meaningful size [are able] to determine the NBBO," so that "execution quality and price improvement statistics required under Rule 605 would be based upon an NBBO that the Commission believes is a more meaningful benchmark for these statistics."[20]  The tiers were designed to reflect current average trade sizes because the Commission believed that average trade size is a reasonable proxy for a meaningfully sized order, which is what a round lot, and therefore the NBBO, is supposed to represent.[21]

The Commission did not stop there.  We also required, for the first time, that odd-lot quotes priced better than the best bid or offer be displayed with market attribution in consolidated market data.[22]  The Commission recognized that particularly for high priced stocks, odd-lots can represent meaningful liquidity at improved prices for retail investors.[23]  Including these quotes in consolidated market data, along with the changes to round lots, is designed to further public price discovery and facilitate best execution.[24] 

While these amendments go a long way to enhancing equity market structure, I do believe there are further steps the Commission can take to help improve public price discovery.  First, it would be worthwhile to assess whether we should revise the current tick size regime, particularly for stocks that the data suggests may be tick-constrained.  Artificially wide spreads that are a function of the tick size regime do not serve public price discovery or facilitate fair competition between exchange and non-exchange markets.  Reducing the tick-size for at least some stocks may also lower execution costs to the benefit of all investors. 

Second, I believe we should consider identifying non-exchange market centers in trade reports published on the consolidated tape.  Currently, when an execution occurs at an exchange, the exchange is identified in the public trade report.[25]  However, when an execution occurs off-exchange, while the symbol, size and price is displayed to the public, the off-exchange market center is not identified.[26] 

The reporting and public display of every trade is important to further the price discovery process.  Consolidated market data is a key tool through which we facilitate price discovery and address market fragmentation.  Identifying off-exchange market centers in trade prints may help alert investors to the market that may have available liquidity at a favorable price and also whether they would even be able to access such liquidity. 

More Pressing Needs

I would be remiss if I didn't mention another item which I think requires regulatory attention and priority.  We have been very fortunate that for the most part, when broker-dealers have been forced to shut down and unwind operations, customer accounts have been able to be transferred to other broker-dealers in a relatively timely manner.  This does not mean that the current system is one which could not pose issues.  I believe we need to focus on standardizing the ways accounts are formatted and processed at broker-dealers so that if there needs to be a liquidation or bulk transfer of customer accounts, another broker-dealer's system could promptly receive these accounts.  If we do not address this issue, I think problems could arise.

Focus on the Pragmatic

In thinking through the ideas I have shared with you today I have sought to focus on pragmatic solutions.  Regulatory enhancements to our national market system are only as good as their ability to work in practice.  The Commission best serves investors and issuers when it focuses on competition enhancing initiatives that limit the potential for unintended consequences that may not even spare a rule's intended beneficiaries.

Moreover, it has been disappointing that a number of important market structure initiatives over the last few years have been the subject of litigation.  I believe it is important for the Commission to learn from these experiences and focus our efforts on ideas that generate greater consensus.  Given the complexity of these issues any potential alteration to market structure rules will be the subject of reasonable disagreement.  But rules tied up in litigation ultimately serve no one.  I believe the ideas discussed today would be the subject of broad consensus and would provide meaningful benefits to equity market participants.  For those that want to discuss these or other topics with me further please reach out, my door is always open.

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[1] Based on comments provided in a fire-side chat with Rich Repetto, Piper Sandler & Co. on October 15, 2021.

[2] See Payment for Order Flow, Final Rules, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34902 (Oct. 27, 1994), 59 FR 55006, 55009 (Nov. 2, 1994) ("Payment for Order Flow Adopting Release") ("Broker-dealers accepting remuneration from a market center for directing order flow to that market center are still obligated to fulfill their duty of best execution to their customers."). 

[3] See Order Execution Obligations, Final Rules, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37619A (Sept. 6, 1996), 61 FR 48290, 48322 (Sept. 12, 1996) (explaining that the "duty of best execution requires a broker-dealer to seek the most favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances for a customer's transaction.").

[4] See Disclosure of Order Handling Information, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 84528 (Nov. 2, 2018), 83 FR 58338, 58374-76 (Nov. 19, 2018) ("Disclosure of Order Handling Information Adopting Release").

[5] 17 CFR 242.606(a)(iii) (requiring disclosure for each identified venue of the net aggregate amount of any payment for order flow received, payment from any profit-sharing relationship received, transaction fees paid, and transaction rebates received, both as a total dollar amount and per share, for four types of non-directed orders) & 17 CFR 242.606(a)(iv) (requiring for each identified venue a description of any arrangement for payment for order flow and any profit-sharing relationship and a description of any terms of such arrangements, written or oral, that may influence a broker's or dealer's order routing decision).

[6] See Disclosure of Order Handling Information Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58374-76 & n. 397 (discussing the types of information to be disclosed on 606 reports); Division of Trading Markets, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 606 of Regulation NMS, Issue 14: Arrangements Affecting Execution Quality at a Venue available at https://www.sec.gov/tm/faq-rule-606-regulation-nms ("The Commission stated in the Adopting Release that, 'because such arrangements would influence a broker-dealer's order routing decision, the amended rule requires disclosure of the details of any arrangement between a broker-dealer and a Specified Venue where the level of execution quality is negotiated for an increase or decrease in payment for order flow.' In the view of staff, the details of any arrangement could include the amount of price improvement (i.e., the level of execution quality), the amount of payment for order flow that is negotiated, and the details of any arrangement where the execution quality or payment for order flow provided by the venue varies based on the characteristics or categories of the order flow that the broker-dealer routes to the venue. For example, such details could include different terms for different categories of securities, if applicable, including categories such as high-priced securities, highly active securities, ETFs, indexed securities (such as securities included in the S&P 500), as well as different terms for different order sizes, if applicable.").

[7] See Payment for Order Flow Release, 59 FR at 55006 ("The Commission believes this approach will further the investor protection goals of the [Exchange] Act, and is consistent with the general philosophy underlying disclosure that 'sunlight is the best disinfectant.'");  see also Disclosure of Order Handling Information Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58341. 

[8] See Elad L. Roisman, Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (June 10, 2021), available at SEC.gov | Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting.

[9] See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43590 (Nov. 17, 2000), 65 FR 75414, 75417 (Dec. 1, 2000) (stating that Rule 605 "will require market centers to prepare and make available to the public monthly reports in electronic form that categorize their order executions and include statistical measures of execution quality.").

[10] See id. at 75434.

[11] 17 CFR 242.600(b)(13) (Categorized by order size  means dividing orders into separate categories for sizes from 100 to 499 shares, from 500 to 1999 shares, from 2000 to 4999 shares, and 5000 or greater shares.); 17 CFR 242.605(a)(1) (requiring monthly 605 reports to be categorized by order size); 17 CFR 242.600(b)(82)(ii)-(iv) (defining round lots for stocks priced between $250.01-$1,000 as 40 shares, priced between $1,000.01-$10,000 as 10 shares, and priced at $10,000.01 or more as 1 share).

[12] See Elad L. Roisman, Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (June 10, 2021), available at SEC.gov | Statement for Investor Advisory Committee Meeting.

[13] See Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices Adopting Release, 65 FR at 75414-15 ("To complement the improved public disclosure of execution quality by market centers, the Commission also is adopting a rule to improve the disclosure of order routing by broker-dealers.").

[14] For a list of registered national securities exchanges see https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html; for a list of ATSs that trade NMS stocks see https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/form-ats-n-filings.htm.

[15] 17 CFR 240.19b-4(m)(1) (Each self-regulatory organization shall post and maintain a current and complete version of its rules on its Web site.); 17 CFR 242.304(b)(2) (stating that the Commission will make public on its website each effective initial Form ATS-N, as amended and each Form ATS-N amendment to an effective Form ATS-N, among other things).

[16] See Market Data Infrastructure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90610 (Dec. 9, 2020), 86 FR 18596 (Apr. 9, 2021) ("Infrastructure Adopting Release").

[17] 17 CFR 242.600(b)(82) (establishing four round lot tiers and defining a round lot based on an NMS stock's average closing price on a national securities exchange from the prior month).

[18] 17 CFR 242.600(b)(11) (defining bid or offer as a price communicated by any member of an SRO to a broker, dealer, or customer, at which it is willing to buy or sell one or more round lots of an NMS security); 17 CFR 242.600(b)(10) (defining best bid and best offer as the highest priced bid and lowest priced offer); 17 CFR 242.600(b)(50) (defining national best bid and national best offer as the best bid and best offer that is calculated and disseminated); 17 CFR 242.600(b)(70) (defining protected bid or protected offer).

[19] See Infrastructure Adopting Release, 86 FR at 18611-20.

[20] See id. at 18621.

[21] See id. at 18618 ("staff evaluated all trades that occurred in 2019 and observed that the average number of shares for all trades was about 193 shares, with an average trade size of $8,842 (excluding auctions, the average number of shares per trade was 178 shares, with an average trade size of $8,068). As a round lot is a trading unit that reflects an order of meaningful size to market participants, and since average trade or order sizes are a reasonable proxy for what market participants consider to be a meaningfully sized order, the Commission believes it is appropriate to adjust the notional value threshold of the new tiers upward to $10,000").

[22] 17 CFR 242.600(b)(21) (including odd-lot information and the attribution of the national securities exchange or national securities association that is the source of that information in core data); 17 CFR 242.600(b)(59) (defining odd-lot information).

[23] See Infrastructure Adopting Release, 86 FR at 18601 ("as a result of the new round lot definition and the inclusion of odd-lot quotations in core data, retail investors will be able to see, and more readily access, better-priced quotations.").

[24] See id. at 18613 ("Making the best priced quotations available in core data is consistent with the Commission's goals in expanding the content of NMS information: Enhancing the availability and usefulness of the information, reducing information asymmetries, and facilitating best execution.").

[25] See CTA Plan Section I.(m) (defining last sale price information as including the identifier of the Participant furnishing the prices) & VI.(f) (stating that last sales prices sent from an exchange include the alphanumeric symbol of the market of execution), available at https://www.ctaplan.com/publicdocs/ctaplan/notifications/trader-update/110000358917/CTA%20Plan%20-%20Composite%20as%20of%20June%203,%202021.pdf; Nasdaq UTP Plan Section VI.C.3 (stating that the Processor will disseminate transaction reports that shall be designated with a symbol identifying the Participant in whose Market the transaction took place) available at https://www.utpplan.com/DOC/Nasdaq-UTPPlan_Composite_as_of_June_6_3_21.pdf.

[26] See CTA Plan Section I.(m) (defining last sale price information as including the identifier of the Participant furnishing the prices) & VI.(f) (stating that last sale prices collected by FINRA and reported to the Processor shall include the alphanumeric symbol that distinguishes those last sale prices from those reported by an exchange); Nasdaq UTP Plan Section VIII.C (identifying 'D' as the symbol for all transaction reports where FINRA is the identified Participant in whose market the transaction took place).

• Securities Industry Commentator
• Bill Singer