Acting through its chief compliance officer (CCO), the firm: 

• failed to establish and implement an adequate AML program and related procedures; adequately identify, investigate and respond to red flags of suspicious activities;
• timely file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR); and
• provide AML training for firm personnel for one year.

Acting through a registered representative, the firm

• improperly facilitated the distribution of approximately 20 million shares of various unregistered securities;
• operated an unregistered branch office, in violation of the restriction on business expansion contained in its membership agreement, and
• engaged in improper telephone solicitations (from the unregistered office) by making materially false representations and omitting material facts in connection with the offer of securities and by using misleading telemarketing scripts that a registered principal had not approved.

Acting through the registered representative and CCO, the firm failed to perform adequate searching inquiries and take necessary steps to ensure that transactions did not involve distributions of unregistered and/or restricted securities.

Acting through a registered representative and firm principal, the firm sold securities to public investors using a private placement memorandum that omitted to disclose a convicted felon’s association with the issuer, a material fact to any reasonable investor.

Acting through various FINOPs, the firm

• failed to maintain accurate financial books and records,
• filed inaccurate FOCUS reports and
• operated a securities business while under minimum net capital requirements.

Acting through the CCO and other compliance officers, the firm

• failed to forward customer funds it received in connection with contingency offerings to an escrow agent by noon of the next business days after receipt of such fund;
• adequately review and approve customer correspondence;
• timely and accurately report customer complaints;
• timely update Uniform Applications for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (Forms U4) and Uniform Termination Notices for Securities Industry Registration (Forms U5);
• comply with the Firm Element of the Continuing Education Requirement for a year;
• conduct an annual compliance meeting; and
• establish an adequate business continuity plan, which consequently led to the loss of access to certain customer records upon termination of its relationship with a particular clearing firm.

The firm had additional supervisory deficiencies, including that

• its written supervisory procedures failed to establish adequate procedures for review of producing managers’ customer account activities,
• it failed to have written supervisory procedures for identifying producing managers that should be subject to heightened supervision, and
• failed to place certain producing managers on heightened supervision, in that, acting through various individuals, the firm failed to clearly assign each registered person to an appropriately registered representative and/or principal responsible for supervising that person’s activities, and designate principals with actual authority to carry out the supervisory responsibilities over the firm’s business.

Acting through a supervising principal, the firm failed to reasonably supervise registered representatives working out of the unregistered branch office.

Acting through firm officers, the firm failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to supervise the sales activities of firm personnel conducted outside of its registered offices, and failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system for determining whether customer securities were properly registered or exempt from registration.

Acting through its CCO, the firm failed to implement adequate procedures to ensure that the firm did not telephone persons who stated they did not wish to receive calls and/or who registered on the national do-not-call registry, and failed to adequately update and maintain a do-not-call list.

Acting through various supervisors, the firm failed to perform heightened supervision over numerous individuals.

Acting through Buchanan, Valores Finamex failed to produce evidence of Buchanan’s review of a registered representative’s correspondence. The Firm’s written supervisory procedures failed to

• identify the registered representative as a producing manager,
• contain procedures reasonably designed to provide heightened supervision over the activities of each producing manager who is responsible for generating 20 percent or more of the revenue of the business units supervised by the producing manager’s supervisor, and 
• assign a qualified supervisor to supervise the registered representative.

The Firm permitted Buchanan to conduct a securities business while he was “Continuing Education Inactive.”  Also, the Firm failed to

• send an annual privacy notice to its customers;
• provide an explanation to its customers of their right to opt out of disclosure of nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties; and
• establish policies and procedures that address and review administrative, technical and physical safeguards for the protection of customer records and information involved in the outsourcing of compliance and operations functions to nonaffiliated third parties.

The Firm effected Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine-eligible securities trades and failed to report, or properly report, those transactions.

Valores Finamex International, Inc.: Censured; Fined $27,500 ($10,000 of which was jointly and severally with Buchanan).

Vincent Anthony Buchanan: Fined $10,000 jointly and severally with Valores Finamex; Suspended in Principal capacity only for 20 business days. 

• email correspondence,
  
• incoming and outgoing hard copy correspondence at the firm’s branch offices that he was in charge of, and
  
• outside investment activity of registered representatives at the firm.
  

• NASD Rule 3012(a)(2)(B) and its requirement that members establish, maintain and enforce procedures reasonably designed to review and monitor transmittals of funds or securities between customers and registered representatives, and
  
• NASD Rule 3012(a)(2)(C) and its requirement of an analysis and determination of whether producing branch office managers should have been subjected to heightened supervision.