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NASD REGULATORY CASES OF NOTE

NASD REGULATION, INC.

OFFICE OF HEARING OFFICERS

DEPARTMENT OF ENFORCEMENT v.
U.S. RICA FINANCIAL, INC.
and
VINH HUU NGUYEN
Disciplinary Proceeding No. C01000003
Hearing Panel Decision on Remand
July 9, 2002
Hearing Officer—
Andrew H. Perkins

SOURCE CITE

 

'34 Act

NASD Conduct Rules 

  • 2110

  • 2120

  • 2210(d)(1)(A) and (B), 

  • 2230

  • 3110

Member firm advertised discount commissions and executed orders on a riskless principal basis.  Failed to disclose principal capacity and hidden profit.  Failed to undertake promised remedial measures.  Firm expelled and Principal barred in principal capacity.

U.S. Rica (USR) was a small online brokerage firm founded in 1996 by Nguyen, who served as the firm’s sole registered principal.  At its peak, the member introduced some 2,500 accounts, which generated up to 300 daily orders (80-90% of which were received online; and 75% of which were limit orders).  

As part of a routine 1999 examination, NASD Staff reviewed USR’s website and found it had advertised online trades as low as $4.95.  There was also a free-trading-day promotion.  Order tickets and confirmations for the relevant timeframe indicated that some trades were effected on a riskless principal basis, but without disclosing to the customer that fact, nor the amount of mark-ups/-downs (some of which exceeded 5%).

What's the problem?
When executing riskless principal trades, a firm does not act as a market maker but rather as a principal.  Consequently, such trades should disclose the principal capacity. A principal trade is usually charged based upon a mark-up/-down, whereas an agent trade is usually charged as a commission.  Regulators tend to view a firm's failure to properly disclose its principal capacity as providing the broker-dealer with an opportunity to hide from the customer any profit it may make on the spread between what it paid/sold for the underlying shares.  This hidden profit is revenue to the firm, in addition to whatever commission it receives.

Nguyen apparently conceded the disclosure violations and agreed to revise USR's trade confirmations and online materials. Upon a follow-up review several months later, the Staff found that the promised corrections were not made and that another allegedly false and misleading advertisement was published that promised commission free Internet orders  --- again without the disclosure of riskless principal capacity and mark-ups/-downs. Respondents’ purported violations persisted even after the filing of the Complaint, only to be redressed just before the commencement of the hearing.  

Among the specific violations cited, were the failure to disclose riksless principal basis and undisclosed mark-ups/-downs for the following situations:

Commissions for customer trades of 500 shares or more
(a) $4.95 for Internet trades;
(b) $10 for touch-tone telephone trades; and
(c) $35 for broker assisted trades.

Commissions for customer trades of less than 500 shares
(a) $10 for Internet trades;
(b) $15 for touch-tone telephone trades; and
(c) $35 for broker assisted trades

What's Going on Here?
When Nguyen’s started USR, he charged $80 per trade. In time, competition (most notably E-Trade) undercut that figure and he was forced to lower USR's rate to $35, where the firm was barely profitable.  When  E-Trade further dropped its commission to $14.95, Nguyen concluded he could not survive without using the riskless principal trading strategy, which allowed him to lower commissions but retain the offsetting profits on the mark-ups/-downs. This gave the firm both a modest commission AND a mark-up/-down.
 

The Staff sought severe sanctions for the conduct alleged, citing persistent misconduct and fraud.  Respondents defend their conduct as simple oversights and mistakes.  They cited competitive pressures and pointed to the fact that overwhelmingly their customer orders got filled at National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO). 

Respondents urged leniency based upon their position that the definition of riskless principal is unclear. The Panel discussed the Buys-MacGregor, MacNaughton-Greenwalt & Co., No Action Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2851 (Jan. 2, 1980) [which NASD Staff sent to the firm for its consideration].  There the SEC stated that trades covered on the same trading day (where the transactions are designed to be offsetting), regardless of sequence, are considered riskless principal transactions--- requiring disclosure of remuneration under Rule 10b-10. Covering transactions effected the next trading date are not construed as contemporaneous with the initial trade.    

  The Panel concluded that the Respondent’s “excessively play[ed] down the egregious nature of their misconduct,” and further noted the intentional nature of the infractions and the extended period of their occurrence. Particular reference was made to the firm’s failure to take promised corrective action.  The Panel:

  • expelled USR

  • barred Vinh in any principal capacity, and

  • imposed joint and several fines of $133,579.83 and costs

COMMENTARY
I'm troubled by this decision.  It is well reasoned and written.  I find no fault in the analysis, nor in the decision to sanction.  This is one of those decisions where I understand why the ultimate sanctions of expulsion and bar have been imposed, but I'm just not convinced that the underlying conduct was so egregious as to warrant the virtual death sentence.  It would seem to be that ordering disgorgement to the customers and requiring the retention of an independent compliance consultant to implement new internal policies and procedures would have been an acceptable interim step.  

Forgetting for the moment the issue of the firm's failure to honor its promise to undertake corrective action  --- which I acknowledge seems to have stuck in the Panel's craw (and rightly so) --- what really happened here?  USR felt overwhelmed by a national firm's published commission schedule and tried to find a way to stay in business.  The plan was to fill customer orders at the NBBO, but to do so on an undisclosed principal basis, albeit riskless principal.  It seems clear that the public essentially got its orders filled at the exact same price they would have, had the same order been executed elsewhere.  The difference, and I allow that this is the point, is that USR made an undisclosed profit on the cost of its acquisition of the shares used to fill the customers' orders --- monies that an agent should give to its principal.  Essentially, if you're charging a commission as an agent you shouldn't then be looking for opportunities to make a transactional profit at the expense of your principal (the public customer).  The reality is that most of those orders if sent to other BDs would likely have been filled at the same limit order price and possibly with a 5% mark-up/-down but without the added $4.95 commission.  

Personally,I think the Panel was properly peeved at the firm's failure to keep the promises it made to the NASD.  To that extent this case contains a significant irritant for regulators and they have sent a message that once you promise a regulator to do something you better make sure you keep your word.

BUT - - -as I've often asked before, would a major national BD that engaged in comparable conduct ever be expelled and its CEO barred?  Before you're too quick to answer, remember the not-to-distant Department of Justice allegations concerning price fixing on NASDAQ?  No firm was expelled.  And let's see what the final results are with both the ongoing IPO allocation and the research/analyst investigations.

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