McLean recommended to a customer that he transfer his existing mutual funds to McLean’s member firm, and told the customer that, if he became dissatisfied, he could liquidate the account at no expense. Shortly thereafter, the customer accepted McLean’s recommendation and transferred the mutual funds.
Thereafter, the customer had suffered losses in those mutual fund investments and wanted to liquidate his holdings. Accordingly, McLean reimbursed the customer $252 for the charges he incurred in selling the mutual funds, thereby improperly sharing in the customer’s losses. The firm’s written procedures expressly prohibited registered representatives from sharing in any benefits or losses with clients resulting from securities transactions.
NAME REDACTED executed mutual fund transactions in customers’ accounts without their knowledge or authorization.
In an effort to conceal his misconduct, NAME REDACTED falsified his member firm’s books and records. Also, he completed and submitted firm switch forms related to the unauthorized transactions he effected in the customers’ accounts and falsely represented that he had spoken to each of the customers and had obtained their authorization before executing the trades. NAME REDACTED provided false information relating to the reason why these customers authorized the transactions, and he knew at the time he made these written statements on firm documents that they were false.
NAME REDACTED altered the firm’s customer telephone call logs with respect to customers’ accounts to falsely show that he had spoken to each of the customers and obtained their authorization to effect the transactions.
Finally, NAME REDACTED accessed the firms’ internal system and changed the telephone number of some customers whose accounts he had effected the unauthorized transactions to incorrect telephone numbers.
Without authorization, Franz took possession of checks payable to the investment adviser firm where he was employed, deposited the checks, which totaled about $21,000, to a personal bank account, and converted a portion of the funds to his own use and benefit.
Franz was the broker of record for a money market mutual fund account that an investor owned, and while the investor was out of state and without his knowledge or authorization, Franz contacted the mutual fund company multiple times and instructed it to issue checks to the investor drawn against his money market account. The mutual fund company issued checks payable to the investor totaling about $271,250 and mailed them to the investor’s residence in Ohio.
Franz obtained possession of the checks at the investor’s residence and, without the investor’s knowledge or authorization, Franz forged his signature on the checks, deposited the checks to a personal bank account and converted a portion of the funds to his own use and benefit and remitted the rest to the investor.
Chima engaged in a pattern of unsuitable short-term trading and switching of unit investment trusts (UITs), closed-end funds (CEFs) and mutual funds in retired and/or disabled customer accounts without having reasonable grounds for believing that such transactions were suitable for the customers in view of the nature, frequency and size of the recommended transactions and in light of their financial situations, investment objectives, circumstances and needs. Some of the transactions were effected through excessive use of margin and without ensuring that customers received the maximum sales charge discount. In furtherance of his short-term trading strategy, Chima engaged in discretionary trading without prior written authorization, falsified customer account update documents and mismarked trade tickets for each of the customers’ accounts, stating that the orders were unsolicited when, in fact, they were solicited.
The transactions generated approximately $450,000 in commissions for Chima and his firm, and approximately $370,000 in losses to the customers; some customers also paid over $75,000 in margin interest. In numerous UIT purchases, none of which exceeded $250,000, Chima failed to apply the rollover discount to which each customer was entitled.
Chima caused his member firm’s books and records to be false in material respects, in that he provided false information on customer update forms for customers’ accounts, signed the forms certifying that they were accurate and submitted them to his firm.
Bartlett signed customers’ names to documents related to purchases of mutual funds and insurance products without authorization. Although the customers authorized Bartlett to purchase the securities or insurance products for them, only one of the customers orally authorized Bartlett to sign his name.
Bartlett signed customers’ names to new account applications, client profiles, risk questionnaires, insurance applications and transaction confirmation forms. In one instance, Bartlett forged a customer’s name because he was concerned that he would lose a substantial commission if he went back to the customer to obtain her signature on a form.
NEXT Financial Group did not have a reasonable system for reviewing its registered representatives’ transactions for excessive trading. The firm relied upon its OSJ branch managers to review its registered representatives’ transactions and home office compliance personnel to review its OSJ branch managers’ transactions, but the firm failed to utilize exception reports or another system, and the supervisors and compliance personnel only reviewed transactions on weekly paper blotters or electronic blotters.
The monthly account statements and contingent deferred sales charge reports for mutual fund activity were also available for review and could be indicators of excessive trading, however, given the volume of trading certain principals reviewed, and in certain cases, the large number of representatives for which the principal was responsible, it was not reasonable to expect principals to be able to track excessive trading on a weekly sales blotter, let alone through monthly account statements or mutual fund sales charge reports.
Due to the lack of a reasonable supervisory system, the firm failed to detect a registered representative’s excessive trading, which resulted in about $102,376 in unnecessary sales charges; the firm failed to identify or follow up on other transactions that suggested other registered representatives’ excessive trading in additional customer accounts.
The Firm did not have a reasonable system for ensuring that it obtained and documented principal review of its registered representatives’ transactions, including sales of complicated products such as variable annuities, and the firm should have been particularly attentive to maintaining books and records that established that the transactions had been properly reviewed. The firm failed to provide reasonable supervision of municipal bond markups and markdowns to ensure that its registered representatives charged its customers reasonable markups and markdowns. In addition, the firm’s branch office examination program was unreasonable because it was not designed to carry out its intended purpose of detecting and preventing violations of, and achieving compliance with, federal, state and FINRA securities regulations, as well as its own policies.
The firm failed to have a reasonable supervisory system to oversee implementation of its heightened supervision policies and procedures for its registered representatives as it failed to comply with the terms of its heightened supervision for its registered representatives regarding client complaints, regulatory actions or internal reviews, therefore it had a deficient implementation of heightened supervision policies and procedures.
The firm failed to have a reasonable supervisory control system or to have in place Supervisory Control Procedures as required by FINRA Rule 3012, and it failed to perform adequate 3012 testing or prepare adequate 3012 reports. Moreover,the firm failed to have a reasonable system and procedures in place to review and approve investment advisors’ private securities transactions.
Furthermore, the firm filed inaccurate and late Rule 3070 reports relevant to customer complaints, and did not file or amend Form U4 and Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U5) reports in a timely manner.
The Firm's AML systems and procedures were unreasonable, as the firm failed to establish and implement an AML Compliance Program reasonably designed to achieve compliance with NASD Rule 3011. Although the firm utilized a money movement report, its supervisors did not detect red flags involving numerous instances of potentially suspicious activities relating to the trading of a company’s stock and the transfers of proceeds relating to the trading of a stock, and thus failed to investigate and report these activities in accordance with its own procedures and the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and the implementing regulations.
In addition, over 1.3 million shares of a company’s stock were traded in customer accounts a registered representative serviced; during a one-week period, the firm’s only AML exception report that monitored large money movement flagged the customer’s account, but the firm took no action and failed to file any SARs as appropriate.