In the Matter of Justin D. Meadlin, Respondent (Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions; Invest. Adv. Act Rel No. 4827' Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18309 / December 13, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/ia-4827.pdf
Meadlin was the co-founder, managing member, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of investment advisory firm Hyaline Capital Management, LLC., which was SEC-registered from May 2014 until August 2015, when Meadlin withdrew its registration. In anticipation of the institution of proceedings by the SEC but without admitting or denying the findings, Meadlin submitted an Offer of Settlement, which the federal regulator accepted and, accordingly, imposed upon Meadlin a Bar from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, with the right to apply for reentry after five years to the appropriate self-regulatory organization, or if there is none, to the Commission. As set forth in part the SEC OIP:
[M]eadlin engaged in a scheme to induce clients, and prospective investors and clients, to invest funds through fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions of material fact. For example, the complaint alleged that Meadlin disseminated dozens of emails to prospective investors and clients, in which he materially inflated Hyaline's assets under management. The complaint also alleged that Meadlin touted a fictitious quantitative fund in email solicitations to more than two dozen prospective investors and in subscription hedge fund databases. Meadlin claimed the fund had as much as $25 million in assets, and he published consistently positive historical performance returns for it dating back to 2009 that were purportedly from a "proprietary" algorithm that he acquired. According to the complaint, none of this was true: the fund did not exist, and never had, and Meadlin never acquired or created any "proprietary" algorithm. Nor had Meadlin and Hyaline achieved the touted historical returns. Based on his fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, certain investors invested money with Meadlin and Hyaline.
Two Los Angeles-Area Managers of Foreclosure Rescue Companies Convicted for Roles in Mortgage Fraud Scheme (DOJ Press Release) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-los-angeles-area-managers-foreclosure-rescue-companies-convicted-roles-mortgage-fraud After a one-week trial, Jamie Matsuba, 33, and her father, Thomas Matsuba, 67, were convicted by a federal jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, making false statements to federally insured banks and committing identity theft in connection with their roles in a foreclosure rescue scheme. Dorothy Matsuba and Jane Matsuba-Garcia previously pleaded guilty and are awaiting sentencing. Defendant Young Park is a fugitive. As set forth in part in the DOJ Press Release:
According to evidence presented at trial, from January 2005 to August 2014, Jamie Matsuba, Thomas Matsuba and others engaged in a scheme to defraud financially distressed homeowners by offering to prevent foreclosure on their properties through short sales. Instead, the conspirators rented out the properties to third parties, did not pay the mortgages on the properties, and submitted false and fraudulent documents to mortgage lenders and servicers to delay foreclosure. The evidence further established that the conspirators obtained mortgages in the names of stolen identities. In addition, the defendants used additional tactics, including filing bankruptcy in the names of distressed homeowners without their knowledge and fabricating liens on the distressed properties, the evidence showed.
Between 2014 and 2016, ADINDU participated in Business Email Compromise scams ("BEC scams") targeting thousands of victims around the world, including in the United States. As part of the BEC scams, emails were sent to employees of various companies directing that funds be transferred to specified bank accounts. The emails purported to be from supervisors at those companies or third party vendors that did business with those companies. The emails, however, were not legitimate. Rather, they were either from email accounts with a domain name that was very similar to a legitimate domain name, or the metadata in the emails had been modified so that the emails appeared as if they were from legitimate email addresses. After victims complied with the fraudulent wiring instructions, the transferred funds were quickly withdrawn or moved into different bank accounts. In total, the BEC scams attempted to defraud over $25 million from victims.