Securities Industry Commentator by Bill Singer Esq

March 24, 2023

FINRA Arbitration Panel Awards Customer Nearly $19,000 in Damages Against Morgan Stanley for Account Liquidation
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Estate of Richard W. Shettle, Claimant, v. Morgan Stanley, Respondent (FINRA Arbitration Award)
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Wall Street employers love non-compete agreements because by the time the ex-employee leaves the penalty box, the ex-employer has done everything possible to retain the business (often while trashing the former employee). As veteran litigator Aegis Frumento sees it, non-competes often are a career-suicide pact. So, it was a rare treat for Aegis to read the 72-page opinion issued by Delaware Vice Chancellor Zurn in Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald LP. that found a non-compete unenforceable.
The Financial Professionals Coalition, Ltd. is a diverse resource for over 1.2 million registered representatives, associated persons, traders, bankers, back-office staff, and owners of broker-dealers and registered investment advisors. The Coalition provides courtesy consultations with industry experts. Membership is free. 

Former Tampa Area Real Estate Professional Sentenced To 24 Months For Money Laundering Conspiracy
In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Frank Sebastian Visicaro, 63, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering; and he was sentenced to to 24 months in prison and ordered  to pay $1,088,440 in restitution. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

[V]isicaro used his real estate company, two shell companies, and bank accounts in the companies’ names to launder the proceeds of an international boiler room fraud scheme, which defrauded foreign victims via the sale of worthless investments. Visicaro used the companies and bank accounts to receive fraud proceeds. Some of the fraud proceeds were wired directly from victims overseas into these accounts. More often, fraud proceeds from the victims were wired to United States-based accounts controlled by other conspirators and then later wired to accounts controlled by Visicaro. In such instances, Visicaro’s accounts served as “buffer” accounts, that is, secondary bank accounts used to transfer and conceal foreign victims’ money and avoid detection by banks.

In total, more than $1 million in victims’ funds flowed into Visicaro-controlled accounts. Thereafter, at the direction of other conspirators, Visicaro wired most of the funds to multiple other financial institutions—held by, among others, boiler room sales agents or other conspirators—in order to promote the scheme and to conceal and disguise the source of, and to hinder any efforts to locate, those proceeds. Visicaro was compensated, via a percentage of the amount of funds he helped to launder, for his role in the conspiracy. 

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SEC Tells FINRA to Raise the Gate For Ineligible Expungement Case ( Blog)
In 2018, a registered representative filed a FINRA Arbitration Statement of Claim seeking to expunge eight customer complaints from her industry record. A FINRA arbitrator dismissed the case. After the rep filed an appeal, in 2020, the judge vacated the FINRA arbitration. The rep re-filed her expungement case with FINRA, which told her that her claims were ineligible for adjudication in its forum. They weren't ineligible when she paid FINRA's fees to start the process in 2018; but, after a court vacated the arbitration award, now, for some reason, FINRA the gate-keeper refuses to raise the gate. Why are we reporting about this crap five years later? Because the mess wound up at the SEC, which has to rule on FINRA's closed-gate policy. 
Ex-broker's lawsuit against Morgan Stanley highlights surge in complaints over mental health issues (Financial Planning by Victoria Zhuang)
As Financial Planning's reporter Victoria Zhuang correctly noted, there will likely be a surge in mental health cases on Wall Street as litigation will likely be fueled by the mandated transition from working-from-home to back-to-the-office. After some three years of Covid pandemic disruption, not all will go smoothly as folks contemplate commuting and a return to workplaces. Very timely coverage!

CFPB Director was validly appointed and its funding structure is not constitutionally infirm 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Law Offices of Crystal Moroney, P.C. Respondent-Appellant (Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; No. 20-3471)
As set out in 2Cir's Syllabus:
Respondent-Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served Moroney with a civil investigative * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. 2 demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. Concerned about the validity of its enforcement action following Seila Law, the CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court (Karas, J.) ultimately granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID.
On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced because (1) the CID was void ab initio under Seila Law, as the CFPB Director was shielded from presidential oversight by an unconstitutional removal provision at the time the CID was issued; (2) the funding structure of the CFPB violates the Appropriations Clause of Article I of the Constitution; (3) Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine when it created the CFPB’s funding structure; and (4) the CID is an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. We hold that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine, and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court enforcing the CID 
N.J. deli stock fraud defendant renounced U.S. citizenship, prosecutors seek detention (CNBC)
Still one of my favorite developing cases; and how could you not be intrigued with a story that generates such a headline?
Robinhood hits class-action marketing firm with subpoena in spam text case (Bloomberg by Alison Frankel)
Bloomberg reporter Alison Frankel does what she does best: breaks down a nuanced, developing lawsuit into understandable explanations. A superb rendition of Robinhood's class-action offensive.

Coindawg Founder Arrested For Laundering Proceeds Of Fraudulently Obtained Small Business Administration Loans / Law Enforcement Officers Seized 18 Cryptocurrency ATMs in Texas and Oklahoma that Charles Constant Purchased to Start a Cryptocurrency ATM Business Using Fraudulently Obtained SBA Loans (DOJ Release)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a Complaint was filed charging Charles Riley Constant a/k/a "Chuck Constant with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, one count of theft of public money, and one count of interstate receipt of stolen money. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

CHARLES RILEY CONSTANT, a/k/a “Chuck Constant,” knowingly assisted others involved in a scheme to fraudulently obtain over $1 million in loans from the SBA, which CONSTANT and his co-conspirators laundered through Bitcoin transactions.  The perpetrators of the fraud against the SBA used false identities and non-existent companies to obtain seven Economic Injury Disaster Loans from the SBA — funds that were intended to help small businesses financially harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The loan proceeds were transferred directly from the SBA to a bank account held by C2 LLC, an entity that CONSTANT owned and registered with the U.S. Treasury Department as a money services business.  CONSTANT then used approximately $700,000 of the crime proceeds — a portion of which he routed through a second bank account held by C2 LLC — to purchase Bitcoin from a cryptocurrency exchange headquartered in New York City.  CONSTANT directed the New York-based exchange to distribute the Bitcoin to his co-conspirators.

CONSTANT then stole the remaining $300,000 of fraud proceeds.  CONSTANT transferred $53,000 of the $300,000 to a third bank account held by C2 LLC and an additional $98,300 to an account in CONSTANT’s name at a cryptocurrency exchange headquartered in California.  Beginning in the fall of 2020, CONSTANT used a portion of these fraud proceeds to purchase, among other things, seven cryptocurrency ATMs (“Crypto ATMs”), cryptocurrency, and promotional services to start a cryptocurrency ATM business named “Coindawg LLC.”  CONSTANT used revenue generated by the seven Crypto ATMs to acquire additional Crypto ATMs and more cryptocurrency to expand Coindawg’s operations.  To date, Coindawg has exchanged over $3,000,000 worth of cryptocurrency and charged 15% in transaction fees.  Below is a photograph of one of the Coindawg Crypto ATMs seized by law enforcement in connection with CONSTANT’s arrest:

SEC Charges Three Sales Agents at StraightPath Venture Partners With Fraud and Unregistered Broker Activity
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the SEC filed a Complaint charging charges Scott Hollender, Gabriel Migliano, Jr., and Frank Vecchio with violating antifraud and other provisions of the federal securities laws. The Complaint names Relief Defendants GSH Empire Inc. and 21st Century Gold & Silver Inc. As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

[B]etween November 2017 and November 2021, Hollender, Migliano, and Vecchio actively solicited investments for interests in funds that were set up as series LLCs, each of which purported to acquire shares of a single pre-IPO company. The defendants allegedly provided investors with marketing materials, advised investors on the supposed merits of the investments, and received transaction-based compensation, all hallmarks of a broker, despite not being registered as brokers. As alleged in the complaint, defendants collectively solicited at least $13 million in investments from at least 115 investors, and, even though each of the defendants received upfront commissions of approximately 10 percent on investments they successfully solicited, the defendants falsely told investors that there were no upfront fees associated with their investments. According to the complaint, the defendants collectively received at least approximately $3.7 million in transaction-based compensation.

SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against IIG Co-Founder for Engaging in Fraud (SEC Release)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a Final Consent Judgment was entered against co-founder of International Investment Group ("IIG) / Martin Silver enjoining him from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

[F]rom October 2013 to at least July 2018, Silver, defrauded IIG's investment advisory clients by, among other things, grossly overvaluing the assets in IIG's flagship hedge fund. As alleged, the overvaluation of these assets resulted in the fund paying inflated fees to IIG, some of which went to Silver.  The complaint further alleges that Silver falsely reported to investors that certain fake and overvalued loan assets, which IIG sold between funds it advised, were legitimate assets and fairly valued.

The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, charges Silver with violating the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Silver, who cooperated with the SEC, consented to a bifurcated settlement, agreeing to be permanently enjoined from violations of the charged provisions, with monetary relief to be determined by the court at a later date upon motion of the Commission.

The final judgment orders disgorgement of $2,306,856, representing Silver's ill-gotten gains, and prejudgment interest of $243,403.98, and that disgorgement shall be deemed satisfied by the restitution order entered against him in the parallel criminal proceeding, United States v. Hu, et al., 20 Cr. 360 (S.D.N.Y.) (AKH). In that proceeding, Silver pleaded guilty and has been sentenced and ordered to pay restitution and forfeit assets.

The SEC previously charged IIG with fraud on November 21, 2019, and revoked IIG's registration as an investment adviser on November 26, 2019. On March 30, 2020, the SEC obtained a final judgment on consent enjoining IIG from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and requiring IIG to pay more than $35 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. 

Financial Advisor, Financial Planner, NBA Agent, And Previously Convicted Fraudster Charged With Schemes To Defraud Professional Basketball Players / Four Professional Basketball Players Defrauded of Over $13 Million (DOJ Release)
SEC Charges Financial Adviser for Misappropriating More Than $1 Million From Current, Former NBA Players (SEC Release)

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, an Indictment was filed charging Darryl Cohen, Brian Gilder, Charles Briscoe, and Calvin Darden, Jr. with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of wire fraud. Further, Cohen was charged with one count of investment advisor fraud; and Briscoe with one count of aggravated identity theft.
As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:


From at least in or about 2017 through in or about 2020, COHEN, a registered investment adviser, orchestrated a scheme to defraud three different professional basketball player clients (“Athlete-1,” “Athlete-2,” and “Athlete-3,” respectively) of a total of over $5 million by taking advantage of his advisory and fiduciary relationships with those clients.  COHEN conspired with BRIAN GILDER, an independent financial planner whom COHEN encouraged his clients to work with and who assisted in tax preparation for Athletes-1, -2, and -3.

First, COHEN and GILDER fraudulently induced Athletes-1, -2, and -3 to purchase viatical life insurance policies at massive markups. COHEN and GILDER did not disclose that GILDER had arranged for a purported law firm (“Law Firm-1”) that he controlled to purchase the polices and then to sell them to the athletes at markups of 222%, 310%, and 244%, respectively.  Indeed, Law Firm-1 made approximately $4.5 million in profit from the sale of the policies to COHEN and GILDER’s athlete clients.  COHEN and GILDER used a substantial portion of these illicit proceeds to pay their own personal expenses.  In particular: (i) GILDER used approximately $257,479 of the funds to pay off a mortgage he owed; (ii) COHEN used approximately $178,462 of the funds to renovate his home and to perform work on his pool; (iii) COHEN used approximately $67,500 of the funds to pay off his personal credit card bill; and (iv) COHEN transferred approximately $200,000 of the funds to an individual with whom he was in a romantic relationship.

Second, COHEN directed that $500,000 be transferred from the accounts of Athletes-2 and -3 as purported donations to a non-profit organization.  COHEN then used approximately $238,000 of the funds purportedly donated to the non-profit to build athletic training facilities in the backyard of his home.  Athletes-2 and -3 never, in fact, authorized any transfers of their funds to the non-profit organization.  When Athlete-2 confronted COHEN about the donations, COHEN told Athlete-2 in a text message, in substance and in part, that Athlete-2’s money had “[h]elped a lot of future prospects and a lot of underprivileged kids.”  COHEN did not disclose to Athlete-2 that a substantial portion of Athlete-2’s donations had, in fact, been used to build an athletic training facility in COHEN’s backyard.

Third, COHEN and GILDER used a sports agency and another law firm to channel approximately $328,125 of Athlete-2’s money to repay a former professional baseball player (“Athlete-4”), who was a disgruntled client of COHEN’s.  Athlete-4 had expressed concern to COHEN about investments and loans that COHEN made on Athlete‑4’s behalf and demanded to be repaid.  On or about February 19, 2020, in the midst of making the payments of Athlete-2’s money to Athlete-4, COHEN messaged GILDER, “We gotta send [Athlete-4] more to get rid of him.”  Athlete-2 did not authorize the use of funds from his account to repay debts owed by COHEN to Athlete-4. 


BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. also defrauded professional basketball players. BRISCOE was an NBA agent, and DARDEN, JR. had previously pled guilty to wire fraud in the Southern District of New York.

BRISCOE served as the sports agent of a professional basketball player (“Athlete-5”).  Athlete-5 began discussing the possibility of purchasing a professional women’s basketball team (“Team-1”), and BRISCOE introduced Athlete-5 to DARDEN, JR.  Because Athlete-5 was not permitted to purchase Team-1 as an active professional basketball league player, BRISCOE, DARDEN, JR., and a relative of DARDEN, JR., who serves or has served on the boards of multiple public companies (“Relative-1”), discussed with Athlete-5 an arrangement in which Athlete-5 would indirectly purchase Team-1 through a company (“Company-1”) purportedly controlled by Relative-1.  BRISCOE provided Athlete-5 with a slide deck outlining a “vision plan” for the purchase of Team-1 by Company-1.  The “vision plan” claimed, among other things, that Company-1 was led by Relative-1 and was advised by a board including several prominent individuals in sports, entertainment, and corporate America. In truth and in fact, and as BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. well knew, at least two of those individuals never served as advisors to Company-1.

Between in or about November 2020 and in or about December 2020, Athlete‑5 caused $7 million to be transferred to a bank account controlled by DARDEN, JR.  Athlete-5 understood that these payments were in order for Athlete-5 to purchase and become full owner of Team-1.  In truth and in fact, none of the money Athlete-5 sent went toward the purchase of Team-1, and Athete-5 did not become an owner of Team-1.  Instead, from approximately November 2020 until approximately December 2021, DARDEN, JR. transferred more than $1 million of the funds to BRISCOE.  In addition, DARDEN, JR. retained a substantial portion of the funds for himself and his relatives, sending more than $500,000 to a relative and more than $400,000 to a cryptocurrency exchange for his benefit.  DARDEN, JR. also used some of the funds to pay for luxury goods for himself, including approximately $880,000 to luxury car companies, more than $300,000 to art galleries, and more than $100,000 to purchase a piano, among other things.  DARDEN, JR. also spent in excess of approximately $1 million in connection with purchasing and making improvements to a residence, including, among other things, the addition of a koi pond.

BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. also worked together to defraud Athlete-2.  BRISCOE, in consultation with COHEN and GILDER, was purportedly building a new sports agency (“Agency-1”) funded by Athlete-2.  BRISCOE convinced Athlete-2 that BRISCOE had signed, through Agency-1, a highly touted athlete preparing for a professional basketball draft (“Athlete-6”).  In fact, Athlete-6 had not signed with BRISCOE or Agency-1.  Rather, BRISCOE forged the signature of Athlete-6 and Athlete-6’s mother on a player-agent contract and sent that forged contract to Athlete-2.  BRISCOE then directed Athlete-2 to transfer $1 million to BRISCOE as a “loan” to Athlete-6 while Athlete-6 prepared for the draft.  In fact, Athlete-6 never had any conversations with BRISCOE or DARDEN, JR. about signing with BRISCOE or about receiving a $1 million loan, and Athlete-6 never received any part of the $1 million loan. Instead, BRISCOE used approximately $306,642 of the funds transferred by Athlete-2 to pay off a debt that BRISCOE had personally incurred and also transferred approximately $544,000 to a bank account controlled by DARDEN, JR.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, an Indictment was filed charging Darryl Cohen with violating Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

[F]rom October 2017 through April 2020, Cohen used client funds, without their understanding or authorization, for personal expenditures including to support his son's amateur basketball program, for a home gym, and to pay back another client whose funds Cohen had misappropriated. Cohen also allegedly sold life insurance settlements to the clients for kickbacks to fund his home improvements.

FINRA Arbitration Panel Awards Estate About $782,000 Against Morgan Stanley
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between The Estate of Joan Ellard, by and through its Personal Representative, Stephanie (née Ellard) Epstein, Claimant, v. Morgan Stanley, Respondent (FINRA Arbitration Award 21-02264)
In a FINRA Arbitration Statement of Claim filed in September 2021, Claimant asserted:

breach of fiduciary duty and associated misrepresentations; breach of fiduciary; fraud in connection of breach of fiduciary duty; negligent misrepresentation associated with breach of fiduciary duty; breach of suitability rules; breach of diligence rules; breach of know your customer rules; breach of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade; fraud in connection with breach of
FINRA rules; negligent misrepresentation in connection with FINRA rules; negligence; breach of contract; and breach of convenant [sic] of good faith and fair dealing.

The FINRA Arbitration Award asserts that the causes of action related to

[C]laimant’s allegations that, at the time when Respondent had actual knowledge of the limits on a limited conservator’s authority, it transferred large sums of money from Joan Ellard’s account through unauthorized transactions at the behest of the limited conservator, even though these transactions exceeded the clear limits set forth in a court order.

At the hearing, Claimants requested:

total compensatory damages of $1,238,518.30 ($547,082.63 in disbursements and $691,435.67 in pre-judgment interest per NMSA§56-8-3); punitive damages of $2,477,036.60 (2x compensatory damages) (total award of $3,715,554.90); and
post-judgment interest of 15% (per NMSA§56-8-4). 

Respondent Morgan Stanley generally denied the allegations, asserted affirmative defenses, and sought the expungement of the matter from an unnamed party's Central Registration Depository record.. At the hearing, Respondent stated that it was responsible for $154,740.00 in damages

The FINRA Arbitration Panel found Respondent Morgan Stanley liable and ordered it to pay to Claimant $554,834.70 in compensatory damages plus $227,438.11 in interest.

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Are annuities an investment? A new SEC lawsuit against a financial advisor argues yes (Financial Planning by Dan Shaw) 
Financial Planning's Dan Shaw reports about an interesting -- some might say "odd" -- SEC action. Reduced to basics, it's a somewhat common regulatory case questioning whether products paying high fees should or should not have been recommended/sold by an advisor. On the other hand, industry regulatory/compliance professionals will certainly see the nuance of the federal regulator getting involved with what some may say is an insurance product (or not).

Former Lumentum Executive Pleads Guilty To Insider Trading / Amit Bhardwaj Misappropriated Information About Impending Corporate Transactions to Trade on that Information and Tip His Associates (DOJ Release)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Lumentum Holdings Inc's former Chief Information Security Officer (“CISO”) Amit Bhardwaj pled guilty to seven counts of securities fraud; two counts of wire fraud; and four counts of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

In approximately December 2020, BHARDWAJ learned that Lumentum was considering acquiring Coherent, Inc (“Coherent”). Based on this information, BHARDWAJ himself purchased Coherent stock and call options, and BHARDWAJ tipped three associates –– his friend Dhirenkumar Patel, another friend, and one of BHARDWAJ’s close family relatives ––and these individuals all traded in Coherent securities as a result.  BHARDWAJ and Patel agreed that Patel would pay BHARDWAJ 50% of the profits that Patel earned by trading in Coherent based on the MNPI provided by BHARDWAJ.  When Coherent’s stock price increased substantially following the announcement of the Lumentum acquisition, BHARDWAJ, his close family member, his friend Patel, and another friend closed their positions in Coherent securities and collectively profited by nearly $900,000.

In or about October 2021, BHARDWAJ learned that Lumentum was engaged in confidential discussions with Neophotonics Corporation (“Neophotonics”) about a potential acquisition. BHARDWAJ provided this information to SRINIVASA KAKKERA, ABBAS SAEEDI, and Ramesh Chitor, and these individuals all traded in Neophotonics securities as a result.  In connection with Chitor’s trading, BHARDWAJ and Chitor agreed that Chitor and BHARDWAJ would split the profits equally.  When Neophotonics’ stock price increased substantially following the announcement of the Lumentum acquisition in November 2021, KAKKERA, SAEEDI, and Chitor closed their positions in Neophotonics securities and made collectively approximately $4.3 million in realized and unrealized profits.

After they were interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) voluntarily and served with federal grand jury subpoenas on approximately March 29, 2022, BHARDWAJ took steps to obstruct the federal investigation of their conduct.  On the day of the March 29, 2022, FBI interviews, BHARDWAJ drove to the homes of certain of his co-conspirators to encourage them not to tell the federal authorities the truth about their insider trading scheme. BHARDWAJ and his associates subsequently met in person on multiple occasions and discussed, among other things, potential false stories that would conceal their insider trading scheme as well as creating false documents to buttress lies regarding payments that were, in reality, related to the insider trading scheme.

SEC Charges Crypto Entrepreneur Justin Sun and his Companies for Fraud and Other Securities Law Violations / Eight celebrities also charged for illegal touting of Sun’s crypto asset securities (SEC Release)

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the SEC filed a Complaint charging Justin Sun and three of his wholly-owned companies, Tron Foundation Limited, BitTorrent Foundation Ltd., and Rainberry Inc. (formerly BitTorrent), for

  • the unregistered offer and sale of crypto asset securities Tronix (TRX) and BitTorrent (BTT); and
  • fraudulently manipulating the secondary market for TRX through extensive wash trading; and
  • orchestrating a scheme to pay celebrities to tout TRX and BTT without disclosing their compensation.

Also charged for illegally touting TRX and/or BTT without disclosing that they were compensated for doing so and the amount of their compensation were these celebrities:

  • Lindsay Lohan
  • Jake Paul
  • DeAndre Cortez Way (Soulja Boy)
  • Austin Mahone
  • Michele Mason (Kendra Lust)
  • Miles Parks McCollum (Lil Yachty)
  • Shaffer Smith (Ne-Yo)
  • Aliaune Thiam (Akon)

Without admitting or denying the findings in SEC Orders, five of the above celebrities agreed to pay a total of more than $400,000 in disgorgement, interest, and penalties to settle the charges; the non-settling celebrities were Cortez Way (Soulja Boy) and Mahone.

As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

The SEC’s complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleges that Sun and his companies offered and sold TRX and BTT as investments through multiple unregistered “bounty programs,” which directed interested parties to promote the tokens on social media, join and recruit others to Tron-affiliated Telegram and Discord channels, and create BitTorrent accounts in exchange for TRX and BTT distributions. The complaint further alleges that Sun, BitTorrent Foundation, and Rainberry offered and sold BTT in unregistered monthly airdrops to investors, including in the United States, who purchased and held TRX in Tron wallets or on participating crypto asset trading platforms. According to the complaint, each of these unregistered offers and sales violated Section 5 of the Securities Act.

The Commission also alleges that Sun violated the antifraud and market manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws by orchestrating a scheme to artificially inflate the apparent trading volume of TRX in the secondary market. From at least April 2018 through February 2019, Sun allegedly directed his employees to engage in more than 600,000 wash trades of TRX between two crypto asset trading platform accounts he controlled, with between 4.5 million and 7.4 million TRX wash traded daily. This scheme required a significant supply of TRX, which Sun allegedly provided. As alleged, Sun also sold TRX into the secondary market, generating proceeds of $31 million from illegal, unregistered offers and sales of the token.

READ the SEC Orders:

SEC Proposes to Modernize the Submission of Certain Forms, Filings, and Materials Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEC Release)
The SEC proposed amendments to modernize its information collection and analysis methods by via electronically submitted filings on EDGAR using structured data where appropriate.As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

Specifically, the proposed amendments would require the electronic filing, submission, or posting of certain forms, filings, and other submissions that national securities exchanges, national securities associations, clearing agencies, broker-dealers, security-based swap dealers, and major security-based swap participants make with the Commission. The proposed amendments would also make certain amendments regarding the Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (“FOCUS”) Report to harmonize it with other rules, make technical corrections, and provide clarifications. In addition, the proposed amendments would require withdrawal of notices filed in connection with an exception to counting certain dealing transactions toward determining whether a person is a security-based swap dealer in specified circumstances.  

Bill Singer's Comment: Sigh . . . at this point, what can I say? Either SEC Chair Gensler can't stop himself or he doesn't want to. The dump truck of new SEC rule proposals has emptied yet another pile of garbage upon an already towering heap. The SEC is now little more than landfill. See: "A Form Of Lunacy Has Overtaken The SEC" ( Blog /  March 16, 2023)

A form of lunacy has overtaken the Securities and Exchange Commission. Those in charge seem to have lost any concept of how to rationally manage a finite amount of resources -- both human and otherwise. Unwilling or incapable of stopping, the SEC continues its excessive resort to rulemaking and rule-amending.

Statement on Electronic Filing by SEC Chair Gary Gensler

Today, the Commission is considering a proposal under the Exchange Act to require broker-dealers and other registrants to submit forms electronically. I am pleased to support this proposal because, if adopted, it would advance the Commission's efforts to modernize filing for a wide range of registrants.

We live in a digital age—paper certificates for U.S. treasuries have long been a thing of the past. Our markets and business models have been transformed by electronic trading, the cloud, artificial intelligence, and predictive data analytics. In 2023, one might think that all filings to the Commission already could be made electronically. That’s not yet true.

Today’s proposal builds on a long line of Commission actions. It was in February 1983—40 years ago last month—that Chairman Shad formed the first task force to explore the feasibility of an electronic disclosure system.[1] In April 1993, the Commission started to require electronic filings through the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, commonly known as EDGAR.[2] In the decades since, we have made numerous other changes to facilitate or require electronic filing and recordkeeping.[3] It was only in 2015, however, that brokers began electronically to file their annual audits with the Commission.[4]

Today, we have the important opportunity to require electronic filing for nearly all of the remaining paper filings required under the Exchange Act.

As proposed, the amendments would require entities under the Exchange Act to file electronically a range of annual and quarterly forms currently filed in paper. For example, brokers and other filers would need to submit electronically their annual audit filings and risk assessment reports. Streamlining the Commission’s filing and processing, this also would help us more quickly analyze filings to ensure compliance with Congress’s laws and our rules.

I believe the proposal, if adopted, would save both registrants and the Commission time and resources. We oversee more than 3,500 broker-dealers, the vast majority of which submit annual audit reports. While many filers voluntarily submit these audits electronically, nearly half submitted them on paper last year. These filings may run as long as 100 pages.

If adopted, the proposal would modernize how the Commission processes these important filings from brokers and other registrants.

I’d like to thank the members of the SEC staff who worked on this proposal, including:

  • Haoxiang Zhu, Raymond Lombardo, Valentina Deng, Patrick Bloomstine, Edward Cho, David Dimitrious, Deborah Flynn, Lourdes Gonzalez, John Guidroz, Haley Holliday, Molly Kim, Matthew Lee, Katherine Lesker, Russell Mancuso, Cristie March, Carol McGee, David Michehl, Catherine Moore, Michou Nguyen, Claire Noakes, Susan Petersen, Justin Pica, David Remus, Kelly Shoop, Rose Wells, David Saltiel, Andrea Orr, Laura Compton, Roni Bergoffen, and Jennifer Colihan in the Division of Trading and Markets;
  • Jessica Wachter, Charles Lin, Parhaum Hamidi, Juan Echeverri, Julie Marlowe, Rebecca Orban, Gregory Scopino, Mike Willis, Lauren Moore, and Jill Henderson in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis;
  • Megan Barbero, Meridith Mitchell, Malou Huth, Robert Teply, Leila Bham, Maureen Johansen, Melinda Hardy, and Mark Tallarico in the Office of the General Counsel;
  • Todd Canali, Paul Gross, Jane Patterson, and Sylvia Pilkerton in the EDGAR Business Office;
  • Ryan Ames, Juanita Bishop Hamlett, and Carrie O’Brien in the Division of Examinations; and
  • Melissa Robertson in the Division of Enforcement.

    [1] See Securities and Exchange Commission, “EDGAR: A Status Report” (Dec. 31, 1985), available at E.g., “In February 1983, the Chairman formed a staff task force to explore the feasibility of an electronic disclosure system. The task force sought information from the public regarding the availability, cost, structure and feasibility of such a system. - 1/ A series of meetings were held with interested parties, and the MITRE Corporation - 2/ was hired to provide technical assistance.”

[2] See Securities and Exchange Commission, “EDGAR Status Report” (Dec. 31, 1993), available at E.g., “Three groups of mandated filers were phased onto the EDGAR system. … These three groups, along with phase-in group 1, which consisted of former Pilot system filers who began live filing on a mandatory basis on April 26, 1993 (plus a few volunteers), make up the significant test group mandated by Congress.”

[3] In 1997, for example, the Commission began allowing brokers to use electronic recordkeeping for books and records, a rule the Commission later amended and modernized in 2022. See Gary Gensler, “Statement on Final Rule Amendments to Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements” (Oct. 12, 2022), available at As another example, in 2004, the Commission implemented electronic filing requirements for self-regulatory organizations’ proposed rule changes through the Electronic Form 19b-4 Filing System (EFFS). See Securities and Exchange Commission, “Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations” (Oct. 4, 2004), available at

[4] See Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: Simplified Process for Electronic Filing of Broker-Dealer Annual Report with the Securities and Exchange Commission” (Jan. 17, 2017), available at As indicated within the linked document, this letter replaces a similar staff no-action letter sent on December 21, 2015.

Bill Singer's Comment: Sigh . . . at this point, what can I say? Either SEC Chair Gensler can't stop himself or he doesn't want to. The dump truck of new SEC rule proposals has emptied yet another pile of garbage upon an already towering heap. The SEC is now little more than landfill. If you were wondering, 56 Staff were enlisted in this idiocy of a rule proposal! See: "A Form Of Lunacy Has Overtaken The SEC" ( Blog /  March 16, 2023)

A form of lunacy has overtaken the Securities and Exchange Commission. Those in charge seem to have lost any concept of how to rationally manage a finite amount of resources -- both human and otherwise. Unwilling or incapable of stopping, the SEC continues its excessive resort to rulemaking and rule-amending. 

Statement on the Proposed Expansion of Electronic Filing by SEC Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw

Thank you, Chair Gensler. The proposal we are considering today consists of common-sense updates to the filing procedures for certain Commission forms. Specifically, as you’ve heard from my colleagues, certain forms currently required to be filed or submitted on paper would instead be filed or submitted electronically.[1]

These changes would build upon the success of electronic filing during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the early weeks of the pandemic, staff in the Division of Trading and Markets acted quickly to provide no-action relief to registrants who could not meet certain regulatory obligations.[2] This included relief with respect to paper filings and manual signatures.[3] As explained in the release, electronic filing has proven to be practical and efficient for staff, and has been well-received by registrants.[4]

The forms would be filed on EDGAR, using structured data formats where appropriate. The release takes a thoughtful approach to structuring the data, using Inline XBRL where it is likely to be most helpful – for example, the financial statement information and longer narrative descriptions for which Inline XBRL was designed – while also using XML and PDF formats. This should help minimize the costs to filers while still preserving the benefits of Inline XBRL for the SEC, investors, and the public.[5]

The changes would not result in any individuals losing access to paper delivery of documents, because the forms in question are forms filed or submitted on paper to the SEC, not sent to investors or other members of the public. While I am among those who still prefer the look and feel of a real book to an e-reader, if the proposed rule is adopted, I don’t expect that SEC staff will miss curling up with a paper version of a newly-filed FOCUS report or Form CA-1.

Thank you to the staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, the Office of the General Counsel, and the EDGAR Business Office for all of your hard work on this proposal. I am pleased to support this much-needed modernization of our filing procedures, and I look forward to reviewing the comments.

[1] In some cases, the proposal would require certain information to be provided via an entity’s website. The proposal also includes certain technical amendments to the FOCUS report. See Electronic Submission of Certain Materials Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Amendments Regarding the FOCUS Report, Release Nos. 33-11176, 34-97182, IC-34864 (Mar. 22, 2023) (“Proposal”).

[2] For a full list of actions the SEC took in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Coronavirus (COVID-19) Response.

[3] Securities and Exchange Commission, Updated Division of Trading and Markets Staff Statement Regarding Requirements for Certain Paper Submissions in Light of COVID-19 Concerns (Jun. 18, 2020).

[4] Proposal at 10.

[5] For a summary of the benefits of Inline XBRL to investors, the SEC, and the public, see, e.g. Commissioner Caroline Crenshaw, The Lessons of Structured Data (Nov. 10, 2021).

Modernizing the Filing Process for Market Participants by SEC Commissioner Jaime Lizárraga

As part of its ongoing efforts to modernize and update its rules, the Commission is taking another step today to keep up with technological change in our capital markets. The Commission is amending the process used by market entities, such as stock exchanges and broker-dealers, to submit certain materials electronically through EDGAR, rather than in paper or via email. These amendments also allow electronic signatures in certain broker-dealer filings.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission took prompt actions to balance the needs of market participants, the health and safety of employees, and our mission to ensure fair, orderly and efficient markets. In 2020, the Division of Trading and Markets issued two separate statements regarding paper submissions, manual signatures, and notarization requirements. The statements provided temporary relief from paper-based filings by market entities as they confronted pandemic-related challenges to their business operations. This relief generally worked well and increased efficiency of Commission processing of these filings.

Today’s proposal builds on this relief by requiring these materials to be filed electronically through EDGAR. This will facilitate more efficient analysis and dissemination of information, which benefits investors and other market participants. Moreover, as part of our ongoing modernization efforts, the proposal would require certain information to be submitted as structured data, which will further strengthen the Commission’s information collection and analysis.

Finally, the proposal should facilitate more efficient review and analysis of these forms by investors. For example, the proposed structured data requirements will make it easier for them to retrieve and analyze key data. Investors could leverage these features to automatically flag unusual activity in a registrant’s financial statements or identify significant operational changes.

I support today’s proposed amendments and would like to thank the staff in the Division of Trading and Markets, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, the Office of the General Counsel, and others across the Commission, for their thoughtful work on the proposal. I encourage the public to participate in the comment process for this rule and look forward to reviewing the comment letters.

Statement on Trading and Markets Proposal to Move from Paper to Electronic Filing Under Various Rules by SEC Commissioner Hester M. Peirce

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Today’s proposal represents an important step in the Commission’s welcome transition from paper to electronic filing requirements, and I support it. Digital technologies have transformed our world over the past several decades, and our markets are no exception: From internal and external communications, to books and records, to the routing and matching of orders, these technologies have contributed to making the markets more efficient, faster moving, and more accessible to investors.

Because our rules have not always kept pace with these developments, regulated entities have had to rely on antiquated methods to meet various regulatory obligations.[1] Paper filings, even if scanned and submitted by email, can be cumbersome for firms to prepare and for investors and regulators to use. Making data reported on paper forms available for investors to conduct cross-firm or market-wide analyses can require substantial, often intensive, manual effort, which can result in significant delays and the inadvertent introduction of errors into the data. Today’s proposal would move a number of forms to electronic formats, which should reduce compliance burdens for, and increase information availability, usability, and reliability in connection with, a broad range of Commission registrants. I welcome these changes.

I am concerned about registrants’ ability to devote the necessary attention to this highly technical release. Registrants overseen by the Division of Trading and Markets have been flooded with proposals over the past two years, and today’s proposal addresses a wide swathe of the Commission’s regulations. We want to get these changes right, and we need commenters’ help, but commenters are overwhelmed at the moment.

I hope to get comment on several specific issues. First, this proposal contains some substantive changes, including with respect to where certain information is to be published and what information is to be included in certain filings.[2] Registrants should not simply assume that this release represents nothing more than a transition from paper to electronic filing. The Commission needs your input on changes to the filings that you are required to make under these rules, and I hope you will provide us with that input, even as I recognize that you have precious little time to do so.

Second, we are proposing a significant increase in the use of structured data. Market participants increasingly rely on structured data to facilitate financial and market analysis, but I have concerns about overly prescriptive Commission-mandated standards in this area, which could become obsolete faster than the Commission can update its requirements.[3] The proposed amendments that would require the submission of structured data generally specify that registrants use either custom XML or Inline XBRL. Although these choices appear reasonable given current technology and practices in the financial markets, is it prudent or necessary to embed this level of specificity in our rule text? We at the Commission may not be able to envision future technological developments that would render these standards obsolete, but history suggests that those advances will eventually appear, whether in the form of a more advanced tagging system or, perhaps, of an AI capable of extracting any data an analyst requests. Indeed, the Commission has seen unexpected technological developments render its rules out-of-date in the past and no doubt will do so again in the future.[4] For example, a more general standard—such as one specifying only that the information be filed in a format that is both machine- and human-readable[5]—might be appropriate for certain filings. If further specificity is warranted, the rules could provide that the Commission or its staff may specify, from time to time, standards as appropriate for particular types of filings. Either approach would have the advantage of permitting greater flexibility for market participants and the Commission to respond to future developments in the way analysts and others use financial data.

I also hope that commenters will tell us whether this proposal gets the balance between costs and benefits right. Does the proposal appropriately draw the line between where structured data is appropriate and beneficial and where it would provide little benefit? In several cases, the proposal would require filers to use structured data for non-public filings, meaning that the public will not benefit directly from those requirements. Do commenters believe that convenience to the Commission in its internal use of the data warrants the expense that filers may bear in structuring the information they are required to report? Finally, have we made the right decisions in prescribing what markup language should be used for particular types of data?

Thank you, David, Ray, and Jessica for your presentations, and thank you to staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and throughout the Commission for your work on this release.

[1] See Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Security-Based Swap Dealers, and Major Security-Based Swap Participants (“Electronic Recordkeeping Release”), Rel. No. 34-96034, 87 Fed. Reg. 66412 (Nov. 3, 2022) (adopting rules providing an alternative to the long-standing, technologically obsolete write-once-read-many requirement for broker-dealer records).

[2] See, e.g., Electronic Submission of Certain Materials Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Amendments Regarding the FOCUS Report at 79-82 (describing proposal to rescind Form 19b-4(e) and instead requiring SROs to post information currently contained on such forms to their websites); id. at 89-94 (describing proposal to require clearing agencies to post supplementary materials to their websites rather than file with the Commission under Exchange Act Rule 17a-22); id. at 145-52 (describing various corrective, clarifying, and harmonizing amendments to FOCUS Reports). The proposal would also amend Exchange Act Rule 3a71-3 to require a firm no longer relying on the arrange, negotiate, execute (ANE) exception to the de minimis counting requirement under the security-based swap dealer definition to file a notice of withdrawal. See id. at 128-29.

[3] See Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Worms and Dinosaurs: Statement on the Proposed Amendments to Modernize How Broker-Dealers Preserve Electronic Records (Nov. 19, 2021) (“Technology changes faster than regulations do.”).

[4] For example, Exchange Act Rule 17a-11 provided for the submission of notices and reports to the Commission by telegraphic transmission until 2019. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers, Major Security-Based Swap Participants, and Broker-Dealers, Rel. No. 34-87005, 84 FR 68550, 68590 (Dec. 16, 2019) (removing this provision “in light of the fact that telegrams are no longer widely used in the United States, and that Commission staff no longer receive 17a-11 notices by telegram”).

[5] There is precedent for such an approach. Last year, the Commission amended Exchange Act Rule 17a-4 to permit broker-dealers to dispense with the outdated write-once-read-many recordkeeping requirement and instead use a record and corresponding “audit trail (if applicable) in both a human readable format and in a reasonably useable electronic format.” See Electronic Recordkeeping Release, 87 Fed. Reg. at 66419.

Statement on Electronic Filing of Certain Forms and Other Filings Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Technical Amendments Regarding FOCUS Report by SEC Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda

Thank you, Chair Gensler, and thank you to the staff for their presentations. Today the Commission proposes to require that certain filings and submissions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules and regulations thereunder be filed or submitted electronically or, in certain instances, for information to be posted on websites. In addition, where deemed appropriate, the proposed rule would require the use of structured data.

There can be little doubt that the Commission is on the right trajectory in transitioning a greater number of filings to electronic as well as tagging information to ensure the data is structured and more readily and economically accessible. In terms of both connectivity and processing power, the technological revolution experienced in the last forty years suggests that processes tied to paper documentation may result in both less intended benefits as well as unnecessary costs, especially when the benefits and costs associated with the efficient usage of such information is properly taken into account. Transparency is at the heart of the Commission’s regulatory model. Information about the markets and market participants that is intended to inform the public should not be trapped within the walls of the SEC; rather, it should be readily and efficiently available to the intended beneficiaries. Electronic filing with information tagged, where appropriate, can help ensure that.

The Release’s Economic Analysis correctly suggests that “the proposed structured data requirements will benefit investors and markets by increasing the accessibility and usability of the disclosures in the Proposed Structured Documents, thereby increasing transparency and insight into the operations, governance, management, financial condition, and other characteristics of the affected entities. Requiring machine-readability for the disclosures would enable significantly more efficient retrieval, sorting, filtering, comparison, aggregation, and other analysis of the disclosures across reporting entities and time periods.”[1] As the Economic Analysis also highlights, “[c]ompared to paper filing, electronic submission or posting information directly to a website can expedite the availability of public disclosures. Improving the speed of disclosure to the public improves the price efficiency of markets by improving the timeliness of information available to market participants.”[2]

Finally, as the Release notes, the Commission has recently gained further additional practical experience in making the shift to electronic documentation in the midst of the COVID pandemic, and saw that much of it worked quite well.[3] In sum, it is time to go more fully electronic and appropriate to issue this proposal to facilitate that objective. That being said, the list of rules and forms affected is long and the Commission may not have gotten this transformation exactly right. For that reason, the assistance of investors and other stakeholders in providing us with their comments will be important.

In light of the foregoing, I support issuing this rule proposal for public comment. I thank the staff in the Divisions of Trading and Markets and Economic and Risk Analysis as well as the Office of the General Counsel for their efforts.

[1] Proposing Release on Electronic Filing of Certain Forms and Other Filings Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Technical Amendments Regarding the FOCUS Report, at 9-10, available at

[2] Id. at 244.

[3] Id. at 258-59.

= = =
The Financial Professionals Coalition, Ltd. endorses a letter to FINRA authored by Ronald Filler, Esq, who is a Co-Founder of the Coalition, Professor Emeritus/Chair of the Ronald H. Filler Institute for Financial Services Law at New York Law School, and a Public Director of the National Futures Association (“NFA”). Filler petitions FINRA to eliminate the requirement that persons seeking to be employed in the securities industry must be sponsored by a Member Firm before they are allowed to take the Series 7 registration exam. 

Should FINRA stop requiring sponsorship to take the Series 7 Exam (Capital Advantage Tutoring  by Kenneth Finnen)

MIGUEL LUNA PEREZ, PETITIONER v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. (Opinion, United States Supreme Court, 598 U. S. ____ (2023), No. 21–887 / March 21, 2023)
As set forth in SCOTUS's Syllabus: 



No. 21–887. Argued January 18, 2023—Decided March 21, 2023

Petitioner Miguel Luna Perez, who is deaf, attended schools in Michigan’s Sturgis Public School District (Sturgis) from ages 9 through 20. When Sturgis announced that it would not permit Mr. Perez to graduate, he and his family filed an administrative complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging (among other things) that Sturgis failed to provide him a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).See 20 U. S. C. §1415. They claimed that Sturgis supplied Mr. Perez with unqualified interpreters and misrepresented his educational progress. The parties reached a settlement in which Sturgis promised to provide the forward-looking relief Mr. Perez sought, including additional schooling. Mr. Perez then sued in federal district court under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) seeking compensatory damages. Sturgis moved to dismiss. It claimed that 20 U. S. C. §1415(l) barred Mr. Perez from bringing his ADA claim because it requires a plaintiff “seeking relief that is also available under” IDEA to first exhaust IDEA’s administrative procedures. The district court agreed and dismissed the suit, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Held: IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not preclude Mr. Perez’s ADA lawsuit because the relief he seeks (i.e., compensatory damages) is not something IDEA can provide. Pp. 3–8.(a) Section §1415(l) contains two features. The first clause focuses on “remedies” and sets forth this general rule: “Nothing [in IDEA]shall be construed to restrict” the ability to seek “remedies” under“other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.”The second clause carves out an exception: Before filing a civil action under other federal laws “seeking relief that is also available” under IDEA, “the procedures under [§1415](f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” Those provisions provide children and families the right to a “due process hearing” before local or state administrators, §1415(f)(1)(A), followed by an “appeal” to the state education agency, §1415(g)(1). Mr.Perez reads §1415(l)’s “seeking relief” clause as applying only if he pursues remedies that are also available under IDEA. And because IDEA does not provide compensatory damages, §1415(l) does not foreclose his ADA claim. Sturgis reads the provision as requiring exhaustion of§1415(f) and (g) so long as a plaintiff seeks some form of redress for the underlying harm addressed by IDEA. And because Mr. Perez complains about Sturgis’s education-related shortcomings, his failure to exhaust is fatal. Pp. 3–4.

(b) Mr. Perez’s reading better comports with the statute’s terms. Because §1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that“see[k] relief . . . also available under” IDEA, it poses no bar where anon-IDEA plaintiff sues for a remedy that is unavailable under IDEA.This interpretation admittedly treats “remedies” as synonymous with the “relief” a plaintiff “seek[s].” But that is how an ordinary reader would interpret the provision, based on a number of contextual clues.Section 1415(l) begins by directing a reader to the subject of “remedies,” offering first a general rule then a qualifying exception. IDEAtreats “remedies” and “relief” as synonyms elsewhere, see§1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), (3)(D)(i)(III), as do other provisions in the U. S.Code, see 18 U. S. C. §3626(d); 28 U. S. C. §3306(a)(2)–(3). The second clause in §1415(l), moreover, refers to claims “seeking relief” available under IDEA. In law that phrase (or some variant) often refers to theremedies a plaintiff requests. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3),for example, says a plaintiff’s complaint must include a list of requested remedies—i.e., “a demand for the relief sought.” Likewise, this Court often speaks of the “relief” a plaintiff “seeks” as the remedies herequests. See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U. S. 256,260. Pp. 4–6.

(c) Sturgis suggests this interpretation is foreclosed by Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154. But the Court in Fry went out of its way to reserve rather than decide this question. What the Court did say in Fry about the question presented there does not advance the school district’s cause here. Finally, Sturgis says the Court’s interpretation will frustrate Congress’s wish to route claims about educational services to administrative experts. It is unclear what this proves, as either party’s interpretation of §1415(l) would preclude some unexhausted claims. In any event, it is the not the job of this Court to “ ‘replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’s intent.’ ” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89. Pp. 6–7.

3 F. 4th 236, reversed and remanded.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Sysco Says $140 Million Litigation Funder Blocking Lawyer Change/Buford Capital is blocking Sysco from settling price-fixing cases/Sysco dropped previous lawyer, who it accused of siding with funder (Bloomberg Law by Emily Siegel)
Wonderful coverage by Bloomberg Law's Emily Siegel of a complex -- perhaps troubling -- development in the way lawsuits are financed. What happens when the lawsuit-funder has invested $140 million and doesn't think the settlement offer is high enough?

Bulgarian Woman Charged For Role In Multi-Billion-Dollar Cryptocurrency Pyramid Scheme “OneCoin” And Extradited From Bulgaria To The United States / Dilkinska was Head of Legal and Compliance for Fraudulent Cryptocurrency Marketed and Sold to Millions of Victims Around the World, Resulting in Billions of Dollars in Losses (DOJ Release)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, an Indictment was filed charging Irina Dilkinska with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

In 2014, RUJA IGNATOVA, a/k/a “the Cryptoqueen,” and KARL SEBASTIAN GREENWOOD co-founded OneCoin,[2] a company based in Sofia, Bulgaria, that marketed a purported cryptocurrency by the same name, which was in fact a fraudulent pyramid scheme.  OneCoin operated as a MLM network through which members received commissions for recruiting others to purchase cryptocurrency packages.  This MLM structure influenced rapid growth of the OneCoin member network.  Indeed, according to OneCoin’s promotional materials, over three million people invested in fraudulent cryptocurrency packages.  OneCoin records show that, between the fourth quarter of 2014 and the fourth quarter of 2016 alone, OneCoin generated €4.037 billion in sales revenue and earned “profits” of €2.735 billion.

DILKINSKA was the purported Head of Legal and Compliance for OneCoin, but rather than ensuring that OneCoin complied with the law, DILKINKSA assisted in the creation and management of shell companies in order to launder OneCoin proceeds and to hold property belonging to IGNATOVA.  For example, in 2016 and 2017, DILKINSKA helped co-conspirator MARK SCOTT, a former equity partner at a prominent international law firm, launder approximately $400 million in OneCoin proceeds through a series of fake Cayman Islands investment funds operated by SCOTT.  Among other things, DILKINSKA used a company named B&N Consult EEOD, which was falsely described as offering “proprietary consulting services, support and software solutions” to its clients and as generating €200 million in 2015 through 2016, to disguise the transfer of millions of dollars as purported “investments” into SCOTT’s funds. In reality, B&N was a shell company that did not generate legitimate income and was used by DILKINSKA to launder OneCoin proceeds.  In or around September 2018, DILKINSKA learned of SCOTT’s arrest in connection with his laundering of OneCoin proceeds.  Shortly thereafter, DILKINSKA burned incriminating documents, sent co-conspirator KONSTANTIN IGNATOV a text message with a link to a newspaper article about the arrest, and then wrote a series of texts, including, “See this!!!!!”; “Something is going on!!!!!”; and “If this is true I need the mega lawyers for whom [co-conspirator FRANK SCHNEIDER] was talking!!!”

On October 12, 2017, IGNATOVA was charged with OneCoin-related fraud and money laundering charges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and a federal warrant was issued for her arrest. On October 25, 2017, IGNATOVA traveled on a commercial flight from Sofia, Bulgaria, to Athens, Greece, and has not been seen publicly since. IGNATOVA was added to the FBI’s Top Ten Most Wanted List in June 2022. The FBI is offering a $100,000 reward for information leading to IGNATOVA’s arrest.

SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Former CFO Charged with Fraud and Lying to Auditors (SEC Release)
In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, a Final Consent Judgment was entered against Osiris Therapeutics, Inc.'s former Chief Financial Officer Philip R. Jacoby enjoining him from future violations of: Section 17(a) of the Securities Act; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, and 13b2-2 promulgated thereunder; as well as aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Further, Jacoby is prohibited from acting as an officer or director of a public company, and liable for reimbursement of $223,965.88 in Osiris stock sale profits pursuant to Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (payment of all but $45,000 is waived based on his sworn statement of financial condition). As alleged in part in the SEC Release:

The SEC's complaint, filed November 2, 2017, charged Osiris with routinely overstating company performance and issuing fraudulent financial statements for a period of nearly two years. The SEC alleged that Jacoby caused Osiris to book fictitious and premature revenue and provided false information to Osiris's auditors. On February 2, 2021, the District Court found that Jacoby violated provisions of the federal securities laws prohibiting: fraud in connection with the offer, purchase, or sale of securities; false certifications of SEC filings; aiding and abetting false SEC filings; and lying to auditors.

. . .

Osiris previously settled the SEC's charges and paid a $1.5 million civil penalty. One of Osiris's former Chief Financial Officers, Gregory I. Law, was dismissed from the case in September 2019. In October 2019, Bobby Dwayne Montgomery, Osiris's former Chief Business Officer, consented to a judgment enjoining him from future violations of the provisions of the federal securities laws that prohibit falsifying books and records and lying to auditors, and ordering him to pay a civil penalty of $40,000. Osiris's former Chief Executive Officer, Lode Debrabandere, was dismissed from the case in November 2022. The final judgment entered against Jacoby concludes this litigation.

CFTC Revokes Registrations of Allianz Global Investors US LLC (CFTC Release)
The CFTC filed a Notice of Intent to Revoke the Registrations of Allianz Global Investors US LLC (AGI US) and an Opinion and Order accepting the settlement offer from AGI US and settling the action by revoking its registrations as a commodity trading advisor and commodity pool operator.
As alleged in part in the CFTC Release: 

Pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the notice alleged AGI US was subject to statutory disqualification of its registrations based on a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) order that found AGI US violated multiple anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In re Allianz Global Invs. U.S. LLC, SEC No. 3-20855, 2022 WL 1644317 (May 17, 2022) (SEC order). 

The SEC order found that AGI US, through three portfolio managers, engaged in a massive fraudulent scheme in which it made numerous misrepresentations and omissions to the institutional investors of funds that employed a complex securities options trading strategy called Structured Alpha. Specifically, the SEC order found that AGI US misrepresented to investors the significant downside risks and actual performance of the Structured Alpha funds. According to the SEC order, the 2020 COVID-related market volatility exposed AGI US’s scheme and revealed that the Structured Alpha funds and their investors suffered billions of dollars in losses as a result of AGI US’s misconduct.

The CFTC’s order finds that AGI US is subject to statutory disqualification from registration with the CFTC pursuant to CEA Section 8a(2)(E)(i) and revokes AGI US’s registrations under the terms in the order. 

CFTC Orders Puerto Rico Commodity Pool Operator to Pay $150,000 for Supervision and Reporting Violations (CFTC Release)
The CFTC issued an Order simultaneously filing and settling charges against DARMA, LLC, a registered commodity pool operator and commodity trading advisor located in Puerto Rico, for filing to diligently supervise its fund administrator’s activities, resulting in DARMA’s failure to accurately prepare and distribute timely pool statements to pool participants -- which resulted in DARMA’s failure to timely file its annual audited pool financial statement (AFS) with the National Futures Association (NFA). The Order requires DARMA to pay a $150,000 civil monetary penalty and to cease and desist from further violations of CFTC’s regulations, as charged. As alleged in part in the CFTC Release:

[S]ince September 2018, DARMA operated two exempt commodity pools. In November 2018, DARMA hired a third-party fund administrator to calculate the pools’ net asset value (NAV), which was a necessary component of the pool statements that DARMA was required to prepare and distribute to its pool participants. The administrator was consistently late in providing NAVs to DARMA and, when provided, the NAVs were often inaccurate, resulting in the preparation of inaccurate pool statements that were repeatedly distributed to pool participants well past the regulatory deadline. Further, in many instances the pool statements needed to be revised and restated. DARMA also failed to file and distribute its AFS, which was to be prepared by the Administrator, with the NFA in a timely manner. 

The order further finds that despite these issues, DARMA did not begin the process of hiring a new fund administrator until November 2019 and did not end its relationship with the administrator until March 2020. This was almost 13 months after DARMA first became aware of the administrator’s lateness in preparing the pool statement for January 2019, and 10 months after it first became aware of the administrator’s inaccuracy. Accordingly, as the order finds, DARMA failed to establish and implement an adequate supervisory system through enforcement of adequate policies and procedures. DARMA also failed to diligently supervise its administrator and thereby ensure pool statements were accurately prepared and distributed to pool participants within the proper timeframe and that the AFS was filed with the NFA in a timely manner. 

The CFTC’s recognition of DARMA’s substantial cooperation and remediation is reflected in the form of a reduced civil monetary penalty.

FINRA Censures and Fines Hornor, Townsend & Kent, LLC Supervision of OBA
In the Matter of Hornor, Townsend & Kent, LLC, Respondent (FINRA AWC 2018059743301)
For the purpose of proposing a settlement of rule violations alleged by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), without admitting or denying the findings, prior to a regulatory hearing, and without an adjudication of any issue, Hornor, Townsend & Kent, LLC submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ("AWC"), which FINRA accepted. The AWC asserts that Hornor, Townsend & Kent, LLC was first registered in. In accordance with the terms of the AWC, FINRA imposed upon Hornor, Townsend & Kent, LLC a Censure and $180,000 fine. As alleged in part in the AWC:

On July 12, 2013, RR 1’s supervisor reviewed RR 1’s OBA request and recommended that Home Office Supervision approve the OBA. RR 1’s supervisor recorded this recommendation in the firm’s systems. Home Office Supervision, however, did not review RR 1’s OBA request until February 2014, nearly seven months after RR 1 submitted the request. On February 9, 2014, Home Office Supervision informed RR 1’s supervisor that RR 1’s OBA request would not be approved. Although Home Office Supervision recorded the disapproval in the firm’s systems, no one at HTK ever communicated this decision to RR 1.

RR 1’s OBA request placed the firm on notice that RR 1 planned to commence selling FIP at an HTK branch office on July 20, 2013. Nonetheless, HTK did not reasonably supervise RR 1 or his HTK branch office. Had HTK conducted reasonable supervision, it would have learned that RR 1 was using firm resources to sell FIP to firm customers, including his firm email account, and his assigned sales assistant (a non-registered fingerprint person at HTK). As a result, HTK failed to detect RR 1’s sales of FIP. Between July 2013 and March 2016, when RR 1 voluntarily resigned from HTK, RR 1 sold over $7 million in FIP securities to 39 investors, including 16 firm customers.

Therefore, HTK violated NASD Rules 3010 and FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010.

FINRA Arbitration Panel Awards Customer Nearly $19,000 in Damages Against Morgan Stanley for Account Liquidation
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Estate of Richard W. Shettle, Claimant, v. Morgan Stanley, Respondent (FINRA Arbitration Award 22-02487)
In a FINRA Arbitration Statement of Claim filed in November 2022, Claimant asserted account errors; breach of fiduciary duty; negligence; omissions. The causes of action relate to alleged "account assets liquidation." Claimant sought $18,954.82 in compensatory damages, fees, and costs. Respondent Morgan Stanley generally denied the allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. The sole FINRA Arbitrator found Respondent Morgan Stanley liable and ordered it to pay to Claimants $18,954.82 in compensatory damages.and $212.50 in filing fees.
Bill Singer's Comment: More nonsense masquerading in the form of a FINRA Arbitration Award. The ONLY allegation set out in the Award is that of alleged "account assets liquidation." As in what? As in how or why was there anything wrong with said liquidation? Why does some specificity with these things matter? Because there may be (and probably are) other similarly situated customers at Morgan Stanley or other FINRA member firms who may have experienced the same questioned liquidations and they are deprived of better understanding their legal remedies. Read the Award for yourself and tell me what Morgan Stanley did wrong and why it was sanctioned for just shy of $19,000. 

= = =
The recent failures of Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) and Signature Bank have brought into question the diligence of the individuals and entities charged with overseeing financial institutions and the broader U.S. financial system. Our oversight responsibilities to the American people require that we evaluate the root causes of these bank failures as well as the failures of U.S. regulatory agencies to prevent these collapses from occurring. These responsibilities include obtaining full information about what appears to be glaring bank mismanagement, fundamental lack of prudence in bank risk and balance sheet management, and regulators’ lack of basic supervision and enforcement of safety and soundness rules, regulations, and principles. As the Committees of jurisdiction over the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), we ask that you provide the following information no later than March 31, 2023:

1. A comprehensive timeline of events related to the Federal Reserve’s lending, supervisory, and examination activity for the last two years with regards to SVB and/or Signature Bank, as well as a comprehensive timeline of events supporting the recommendation to invoke the Systemic Risk Exception for these two banks; and

2. The names and titles of all officials or employees of the Federal Reserve (including, but not limited to, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Banks of San Francisco and New York) involved in any capacity with supervising, examining, or lending to SVB and/or Signature Bank and/or the recommendation to invoke the Systemic Risk Exception for these two banks.
Furthermore, this letter serves as a formal request to preserve all existing and future records and materials in your possession relating to the topics addressed in this letter. . . .  

Last individual admits role in nationwide fraud scheme targeting elderly victims (DOJ Release)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Anirudha Kalkote, 25, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud. Previously, MD Azad, 26, Sumit Kumar Singh, 25, Himanshu Kumar, 25, and MD Hasib, 27 , pled guilty and are awaiting sentencing.. As alleged in part in the DOJ Release:

Anirudha Kalkote admitted he participated in a fraud ring from 2019-2020 which operated out of various cities including Houston. The scheme targeted elderly victims throughout the United States and elsewhere.

The ring tricked and deceived victims using various ruses and instructed them to send money via wire through a money transmitter business such as Western Union or MoneyGram, by buying gift cards and providing to the fraudsters or by mailing cash to alias names via FedEx or UPS.

Part of the scheme involved fraudsters contacting victims by phone or via internet sites for computer technical support and directing victims to a particular phone number. Once victims contacted the fraudsters, they were told various stories such as they were communicating with an expert that needed remote access to their computer in order to provide technical support services. The fraudsters then gained access to victims’ personal data and bank and credit card information.

Victims typically paid a fee to conspirators for the fake technical support but were later told they were due a refund. Through paying for “technical support” or through the “refund” process, the ring gained access to the victim’s bank account(s) and credit cards and manipulated the accounts to make it appear the victim was paid too large a refund due to a typographical error. Victims were then instructed to reimburse the ring by various means.

Victims were sometimes re-victimized multiple times and threatened with bodily harm if they did not pay.

Remarks to Investment Company Institute 2023 Investment Management Conference by SEC Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda

Thank you, Susan Olson, for that kind introduction.  After graduating law school in 1995, I became an associate with the asset management practice of a law firm in Washington, D.C.  The following spring, I remember the partners getting excited about the Investment Company Institute’s upcoming conference in Palm Desert, California.  Since attendance was largely a “partners-only” affair, this conference carried a bit of mystique to the associates and as a native Southern Californian, this event was doubly intriguing to me.  Thus, I was quite honored to be invited to speak with you here today and share some thoughts.  My remarks reflect solely my individual views as a Commissioner and do not necessarily reflect the views of the full Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

There is a common theme running through the conference program.  For example, today, there is a panel on “Fund Governance in an Era of Regulatory Deluge.” Tomorrow, there is a panel on “Addressing Compliance Challenges in Today’s Unprecedented Economic and Regulatory Environment.”  These titles aptly convey the sense of frustration in navigating the current regulatory challenges and what potentially may come. 

In the last 18 months, the Commission has adopted final rules affecting asset managers on:

    • Shortening the trade settlement cycle;
    • Additional proxy vote reporting requirements on Form N-PX;
    • Tailored fund shareholder reports; and
    • Proxy voting advice.

The Commission has further issued proposals on:

    • Cybersecurity for investment advisers and investment companies;
    • Amendments to Regulation S-P;
    • Custody for investment advisers;
    • Order competition;
    • Regulation Best Execution;
    • Open-end fund liquidity;
    • Outsourcing by investment advisers;
    • Environmental, social, and governance disclosures for investment companies and investment advisers;
    • Investment company names;
    • Short positions for institutional investment managers;
    • Money market reform; and
    • Reporting of securities loans.

Furthermore, the Commission has many other proposals affecting public company issuers for which the asset management industry is intended to be one of the primary beneficiaries because they will allow you to provide better returns and value for your clients – at least in theory.

That’s a lot of moving parts in a short period of time.  It makes you wonder whether the Commission believes that there is something fundamentally wrong with the markets in the asset management industry.  Because unlike the 2008 financial crisis, there has been no Congressional directive mandating our actions.

In the Commission’s rush to rulemaking, there is no question that significant compliance challenges and costs will result.  These costs are likely to disproportionately hurt smaller fund complexes and their advisers.  Raising the expenses to operate a registered investment company can make them less attractive as investment options for 401(k) and similar plans, which can choose less regulated vehicles that may also be cheaper, such as collective investment trusts (“CITs”).  While some might argue that the Commission should try persuade the banking regulators to improve their CIT regulations, after the events of the last several weeks, I suspect that they have more pressing issues on their minds.

I will begin my remarks by discussing my concerns with the Commission’s current regulatory approach and some significant regulatory topics, such as open-end fund liquidity, ESG, and fund names, before closing with some practical, common sense suggestions to improve the regulatory framework.

The Perils of Regulation by Theory and Hypothesis

This brings me to my first concern: the perils of regulation by theory and hypothesis.  The SEC has been focused on rulemakings based on unrealistic expectations of how the world functions and how it ought to be.  A good example is the proposal mandating that open-end funds institute swing pricing and a hard 4:00 pm Eastern Time close, among other requirements.[1]  This proposal looks to Europe and academic papers envisioning systems completely different from the U.S. experience. 

Many of the Commission’s rulemaking proposals are interrelated and interconnected, yet these proposals are not evaluated pragmatically and holistically.  Recent examples include the four equity market structure proposals[2] and the multiple proposals involving cybersecurity, such as amendments to Regulations S-P and SCI, and cybersecurity risk management programs for broker-dealers, funds, registered investment advisers, exchanges, and other entities.[3]  Notably, the economic analysis only considers the costs and benefits of each proposal in isolation, asking commenters to weigh in on any overlap.  Why should the Commission be asking the public to figure it out?  The SEC should publicly state its views on the overall problem being addressed and should not try to avoid its obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act to have a reasoned basis by dividing its regulatory response into small, compartmentalized proposals.

Unfortunately, the asset management industry will likely struggle to cope with the resource challenges and complexity of these multiple and overlapping rulemakings.  To what end?  What requires fundamental overhaul of all of these different areas at the same time?  Smaller firms, including many owned by women and minorities, are likely to be the hardest hit and it would not be surprising if the burdens cause some of these firms to stop doing business or seek to become acquired.  If the industry becomes smaller and less diverse, this could lead to a concentration of strategies, a decrease in choice for investors, and the potential for large financial monoliths that vote and invest the same way.   

Let me now turn to some specific areas of fund regulation.

Open-end Fund Liquidity

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, academics and prudential regulators around the world have been deeply concerned about the liquidity in open-end funds – and not solely money market funds – as a source of systemic risk.  Their narrative is that because open-end funds allow investors to purchase or redeem shares on a daily basis but hold assets that are generally less liquid (the so-called “liquidity mismatch”), these funds are engaged in “liquidity transformation.”  Liquidity transformation may incentivize investors to rush to the exits in market downturns to obtain the “first mover advantage” to redeem before other investors.  If the redemptions are sufficiently large, funds will engage in fire sales of portfolio assets.  These fire sales could adversely affect other market participants, such as through financial interconnections.  If conditions deteriorate, then central banks may have to intervene to restore financial stability.   The thought was that this type of run risk and threat to financial stability can only occur in open-end funds, but not banking organizations that are subject to prudential regulation.  Perhaps that now needs to be revisited. 

The liquidity transformation narrative for funds, which has been embraced by academics and organizations such as the Financial Stability Board and European central banks, has prompted certain policy proposals in the United States.  One SEC proposal would require mutual funds to engage in swing pricing, institute a 4:00 pm Eastern Time hard close, and implement restrictive liquidity requirements.[4]  As responsible regulators and market participants, we should want significant weaknesses in the system to be addressed – if they exist.  At the same time, however, we should be wary of unintended consequences of a prudential approach to fund regulation: if registered investment companies are regulated to the extent that they are less desirable options for 401(k) and other retirement plans, collective investment trusts and other less regulated investment options may fill the gap.  Importantly, investors will have fewer protections and will not have the robust fund disclosures, limitations on conflicts of interest, and board oversight that they do today – to name just a few of the substantive protections that fund investors receive.

In this regard, before the current system is completely changed, it is worth a closer look at the narrative and whether it stands up to scrutiny.  Here are a few concerns.

First, the academic studies postulating this narrative have certain limitations, such as the lack of U.S. regulatory data.  However, many of these papers use data sets that were incomplete.  A significant amount of this information is now publicly available on Form N-PORT, which the Commission adopted in 2016.[5]  In fact, one of the stated benefits of Form N-PORT was that “[m]ore timely portfolio investment information will improve the ability of Commission staff to oversee the fund industry by monitoring industry trends, informing policy and rulemaking, identifying risks, and assisting Commission staff in examination and enforcement efforts.”[6]  The Commission should be using this regulatory data to test whether the hypothesis is correct. 

Of course, information about fund trading activity and the prices at which funds purchase and sell each instrument are not publicly available – nor should they be.  Nonetheless, there is the ability to provide a more complete picture using this data that should be compiled, analyzed, and reviewed by the SEC.  In this regard, I appreciate the substantial effort that commenters have made in responding to the proposal on open-end fund liquidity, such as re-examining and questioning the academic hypothesis by incorporating data into the analyses, expressing their concerns as board members, and recommending certain improvements.

Second, this hypothesis generally has been focused on European funds and then applied to U.S. mutual funds with only glancing references to the fundamental differences that exist.  This is particularly true given the very different distribution channels, regulatory requirements, and types of investors between the United States and Europe.  The experience, for example, of swing pricing for Luxembourg funds during March 2020 may be applicable to fund regulation in Luxembourg and perhaps other parts of Europe, but the investor base, regulatory framework, and retirement plan channels in the United States are meaningfully different such that they should not be understated or assumed away.[7] 

I also am puzzled by some claims, such as in the SEC’s open-end fund liquidity proposal, that the events of March 2020 support the view that mutual funds present systemic risk and must be addressed through tools like swing pricing and more restrictive liquidity requirements.  The evidence that U.S. mutual funds as a whole were unable to meet their liquidity needs or that they transmitted systemic risk through interconnections in the financial system in March 2020 is questionable.  According to the proposing release, the Commission and its staff already had the tools to take emergency action, such as interfund lending and short-term funding, but they were not used.[8]

While the Federal Reserve intervened to establish the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, among other actions, the events of March 2020 were due to a global pandemic that had – and continues to have – broad impacts on the economy.  Central banks were created to address severe crises in the markets – and one stemming from a global pandemic would qualify.  Notably, despite the vaunted use of swing pricing in Europe, the European Central Bank also intervened to provide liquidity to the fixed income markets.[9]  One wonders whether the events of March 2020 simply gave banking regulators an excuse to fulfill a longstanding goal to regulate the fund industry in a prudential manner.


With respect to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in investing, I have noted my concerns about ESG-related strategies, including their potential underperformance and premium costs for investors.[10]  Moreover, there are concerns as to whether the various regulatory attempts are intended to benefit the financial returns of investors or alternatively to force particular investment or operational outcomes.  Seemingly pushed aside is the notion that the existing disclosure regime works well in requiring funds to disclose information that is material to an investment decision from an economic standpoint.  Investors that wish to pay for ESG strategies should continue have that choice and the current disclosure regime provides them with sufficient information to do so.  

But continuing on with the theme of overlapping, complex proposals that are not grounded in practical reality – the Commission has proposed three rules that attempt to address ESG issues: one for corporate issuers,[11] one for investment advisers and funds,[12] and one for the use of “ESG” in a fund name.[13]  It is not surprising that some concerns have been raised about the effects that these rules would have, particularly when one considers the experience of the European Union’s approach to sustainable finance for non-financial and financial entities.  

The EU’s sustainability finance regime ought to be taken as a cautionary tale.  In particular, the European Union has taken a sprawling approach to sustainable finance.  These efforts include the expansive Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which requires certain companies to disclose information about how environmental, social and human rights, and governance factors affect their operations and how their business model impacts those factors.[14]  In addition, the EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) mandates sustainability reporting by investment firms, including assessing sustainability-related risks in investments, and how ESG funds are marketed and sold.[15]  The EU Taxonomy Regulation – at more than 500 pages – attempts to create a common understanding for organizations to identify “environmentally sustainable” economic activities.[16] 

The EU’s ambitious plan has had significant implementation challenges, including conflicting standards and interdependencies, and not to mention a potentially large drag on the economy.  The Commission should be considering the experience in the European Union.  The Commission also ought to consider the potential limitations on its authority, including the major questions doctrine outlined in West Virginia v. EPA.[17]  On a practical level, the Commission should give significant thought to how it sequences any final rules.  Given that fund and adviser disclosure – as proposed – rely in part on corporate disclosure, the Commission should avoid making the same sequencing and other mistakes as the European Union.[18]  Arguably, the failure to consider how these three rules should be considered and interact could weaken any final Commission rules under the arbitrary and capricious standard required by the Administrative Procedure Act.

Fund Names  

In keeping with the theme of Commission proposals that have significant challenges, let’s turn to the “Fund Names” proposal.  In May 2022, the Commission proposed extensive changes to Rule 35d-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.[19]  The existing Fund Names Rule requires that funds with certain names adopt a policy to invest 80 percent of their assets in the investments suggested by that name, among other conditions.  The current rule applies to names that suggest (1) a particular type of investment, (2) a particular industry, or (3) a particular geographic area.  The proposal would significantly extend the Fund Names Rule to names that imply investments that have, or investments whose issuers have, “particular characteristics.”  While the Commission did not define the meaning of “particular characteristics,” it used the terms “value,” “growth,” and “ESG,” among others.  

These terms, among other aspects of the proposal, would rely on subjective judgments.  Are the investor benefits, if any, worth the significant implementation costs?  For example, the SEC has estimated astounding costs of up to $5 billion, or $500,000 per fund, which likely be passed down to investors.[20]  The supposed benefits to investors – which include the presumption that investors solely look at the fund’s name in choosing an investment – do not appear compelling, at least as presented in the current proposal.  The Fund Names Rule would also provide no benefits to the vast majority of investors who rely on an investment adviser or a broker to select their funds for them.  Accordingly, it is difficult to understand why the proposed changes are needed to the Fund Names Rule in light of its supposed benefits and extraordinary costs.  Further, if the amendments are adopted, there will likely be a significant burden on staff resources to process the amended prospectus disclosures that will result.  I very much appreciate the comments that have been submitted on this proposal.

Practical Areas for Improvement

Having noted my concerns with an asset management rulemaking agenda that seems dominated by more theoretical concerns, are there other areas – which I call “good government” projects – that the Commission should be working on?  In other words, what should the Commission be doing as a careful steward of its resources?

Commission efforts should be focused on projects that provide tangible improvements for investors by providing clear guidelines to firms in meeting their regulatory obligations.  In considering areas of improvement, the Commission should be sensitive to the current economic environment, where investors and their investment advisers are struggling to cope with the effects of the pandemic and high inflation.  Crippling firms with new regulatory burdens may cause them to exit and/or increase costs, thus reducing investment returns and choices for investors and making it more difficult for investors to achieve their financial goals.  It is particularly important that in times of high volatility and uncertain markets, that the efforts of asset managers are focused on their core service – providing high quality investment advice to their clients.

In particular, the Commission should review the current rulebook to see what is not working, including issuing concept releases on important topics, producing thoughtful analysis of the data currently gathered by the Commission, holding public roundtables, and publishing views for public comment, rather than proceeding immediately to rulemaking. 

The Commission could seek to improve fund disclosure for investors, including through the use of investor testing, so that disclosure policy can be informed by data indicating how investors will use and benefit from changes.  For example, there are several outdated and dense fund forms that are likely information overload for investors and costly for funds to complete.  These include filings such as Form N-14, which is used by funds in certain reorganizations and often includes hundreds of pages of dense financial information, and Form N-2 for closed-end funds.  It should not take an act of Congress before the Commission makes efforts to tailor its registration forms for financial products of interest to investors.[21]

In this regard, I supported the Commission’s adoption of rule and form amendments to create streamlined shareholder reports for ETFs and mutual funds.[22]  This rulemaking was backed by an effort over the past 10 years to engage in investor testing on shareholder reports.  These types of rulemakings can yield big benefits so long as they are carefully calibrated, including staggered compliance dates for smaller entities.

In closing, I strongly believe that the regulatory approach to mutual funds, closed-end funds, and ETFs is not broken.  If the Commission continues on its current regulatory path, however, I am concerned that investors, and the markets as a whole, may be worse off.  The Commission’s thinking must be grounded in practical, real world costs and benefits that are informed by data and experience – not hypotheses.  The Commission should expose its views to public review through published guidance, rather than in remaining in a state of seclusion and isolation.  Finally, many of you have taken a significant amount of time and effort to comment on the multiple rulemakings, including providing data and suggestions for improvement.  Thank you – I very much appreciate your efforts and insights.

[1] Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs and Swing Pricing; Form N-PORT Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 11130 (Nov. 2, 2022) [87 FR 77172 (Dec. 16, 2022)] (“OEF Liquidity”), available at

[2] Disclosure of Order Execution Information, Exchange Act Release No. 96493 (Dec. 14, 2022) [88 FR 3786 (Jan. 20, 2023)], available at; Regulation NMS: Minimum Pricing Increments, Access Fees, and Transparency of Better Priced Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 96494 (Dec. 14, 2022) [87 FR 80266 (Dec. 29, 2022)], available at; Order Competition Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 96495 (Dec. 14, 2022) [88 FR 128 (Jan. 3, 2023)], available at; and Regulation Best Execution, Exchange Act Release No. 96496 (Dec. 14, 2022) [88 FR 5440 (Jan. 27, 2023)], available at

[3] Cybersecurity Risk Management Rule for Broker-Dealers, Clearing Agencies, Major Security-Based Swap Participants, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, National Securities Associations, National Securities Exchanges, Security-Based Swap Data Repositories, Security-Based Swap Dealers, and Transfer Agents, Exchange Act Release No. 97143 (Mar. 15, 2023), available at;    Regulation S‑P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and Safeguarding Customer, Exchange Act Release No. 97141 (Mar. 15, 2023), available at; Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release No. 97143 (Mar. 15, 2023), available at; and Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies, Securities Act Release No. 11028 (Feb. 9, 2022) [87 FR 13524 (Mar. 9, 2022)], available at; and Reopening of the Comment Period for Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies, Securities Act Release No. 11167 (Mar. 15, 2023), available at

[4] OEF Liquidity, supra note 1.

[5] Investment Company Modernization, Securities Act Release No. 10231 (Oct. 13, 2016) [81 FR 81870 (Nov. 18, 2016)].

[6] Id. at 350.

[7] See, e.g., BlackRock, Swing Pricing - Raising the Bar (Sept. 2021), available at (suggesting that “alternate” methods of swing pricing should be considered, notwithstanding “insurmountable barriers” in the United States).

[8] Open-End Liquidity at n. 57.

[9] See European Central Bank, Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, available at

[10] See, e.g., Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Remarks at the ’40 Acts Group (Jan. 27, 2023), available at; Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation (Nov. 17, 2022),  available at; and Remarks at the Georgetown Hotel and Lodging Summit (Oct. 25, 2022), available at

[11] The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Securities Act Release No. 11042 (Mar. 21, 2022) [87 FR 21334 (Apr. 11, 2022)], available at

[12] Enhanced Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies About Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment Practices, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 6034 (May 25, 2022) [87 FR 36654 (June 17, 2022)], available at

[13] Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act Release No. 34593 (May 25, 2022) [87 FR 36594 (June 17, 2022)], available at

[14] Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards corporate sustainability reporting, available at

[15] Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, available at

[16] Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, available at 

[17] West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022).

[18] BNY Mellon, ESG: Regulatory Change and Its Implications, available at (noting, among other things, challenges for financial market participants to disclose information with access to robust and reliable corporate sustainability data).

[19] Investment Company Names, Securities Act Release No. 11067 (May 25, 2022) [FR 36594 (June 17, 2022)] (“Fund Names”), available at 

[20] See Fund Names at 145.  Commenters have noted that these costs are understated.  See, e.g., Investment Company Institute letter (Aug. 16, 2022), available at, Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young LLP (Aug. 16, 2022), available at

[21] Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, Pub. L. 117-328, at Division AA, Title I.

[22] Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Final Rule Regarding Tailored Shareholder Reports for Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds; Fee Information in Investment Company Advertisements, available at (noting, however, that the Commission should address concerns regarding the disclosure requirements related to acquired fund fees and expenses).

FINRA Suspends Rep For Inaccurate Customer Contact Notes
In the Matter of Derek John Rehill , Respondent (FINRA AWC 2020066887202)
For the purpose of proposing a settlement of rule violations alleged by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), without admitting or denying the findings, prior to a regulatory hearing, and without an adjudication of any issue, Derek John Rehill submitted a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent ("AWC"), which FINRA accepted. The AWC asserts that Derek John Rehill  was first registered in 1998 with Joseph Stone Capital L.L.C.. In accordance with the terms of the AWC, FINRA imposed upon Derek John Rehill  a two-month suspension from associating with any FINRA member in all capacities; because he submitted a statement of financial condition and demonstrated an
inability to pay, no fine was imposed. As alleged in part in the AWC:

During the relevant period, Rehill was responsible for periodically calling customers whose accounts Joseph Stone had identified as “actively traded” to confirm, among other things, the investment objective and risk tolerance reflected on the customer’s new account form. For each call, Rehill was required to complete a customer contact form which included fields for Rehill to record whether the customer had confirmed his or her investment objective and risk tolerance.

On four occasions during the relevant period, Rehill completed customer contact forms that inaccurately stated that customers had confirmed their investment objectives and risk tolerances. On three of the four occasions, Rehill completed customer contact forms reflecting that customers had confirmed they had a speculative investment objective when, in fact, the customers had not. For example, one such customer told Rehill that he wanted to “do more of a long-term thing than keep buying and selling so much.” On the fourth occasion, Rehill completed a customer contact form reflecting that a customer had confirmed he had a speculative risk tolerance when Rehill had not asked the customer any questions about his risk tolerance.

Therefore, Rehill violated FINRA Rule 2010.