Enforcement Actions
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
U4, U5, RE-3, RULE 3070
2010
NOTE: Stipulations of Fact and Consent to Penalty (SFC); Offers of Settlement (OS); and Letters of Acceptance Waiver, and Consent (AWC) are entered into by Respondents without admitting or denying the allegations, but consent is given to the described sanctions & to the entry of findings. Additionally, for AWCs, if FINRA has reason to believe a violation has occurred and the member or associated person does not dispute the violation, FINRA may prepare and request that the member or associated person execute a letter accepting a finding of violation, consenting to the imposition of sanctions, and agreeing to waive such member's or associated person's right to a hearing before a hearing panel, and any right of appeal to the National Adjudicatory Council, the SEC, and the courts, or to otherwise challenge the validity of the letter, if the letter is accepted. The letter shall describe the act or practice engaged in or omitted, the rule, regulation, or statutory provision violated, and the sanction or sanctions to be imposed.
Guy Steven Amico (Principal)
AWC/2007007151705

As his member firm’s president, Amico failed to adequately supervise the firm’s chief compliance officers (CCOs) and AML compliance officers (AMLCOs). Amico knew, or should have known, of substantive violations of FINRA rules and the potential inadequacy of firm compliance personnel through FINRA exit conference reports that the firm failed to

  • properly report customer complaints and other reportable matters,
  • make Form U4 or Form U5 amendments to report disclosable events, and
  • timely amend Forms U4 or U5.

Amico received FINRA exit conference reports regarding violations of the BSA and FINRA AML rules. Amico received SEC written findings identifying suspicious penny stock transactions, AML program issues and reporting deficiencies.

As the president and owner of the firm, Amico was responsible for the firm’s compliance with regulatory requirements imposed on the firm and knew, or should have known, that the firm’s CCOs and AMLCOs were not performing the compliance functions designated to them. Amico knew through FINRA exit conference reports and SEC written findings that the firm, through the CCOs and AMLCOs, was not in compliance with BSA requirements and NASD Rule 3011, was not making necessary filings under NASD Rule 3070 and Article V, Sections 2 and 3 of FINRA’s By-Laws, and that one of the CCOs/AMLCOs had a disciplinary history but failed to take affirmative steps to ensure that they were performing the AML and reporting functions delegated to them.

Guy Steven Amico (Principal): Fined $100,000; Suspended Principal capacity only 4 months; Required to complete 8 hours of AML Training; Required to register for AML training within 60 days of issuance of the AWC and provide evidence to FINRA of the registration within 10 days of registration; attend such training within six months of issuance of this AWC and provide FINRA with evidence of completion of training within 10 days of completion of the training program.
Tags: Supervision  AML  
Bill Singer's Comment

An interesting case because it holds a firm's President liable not so much for what he did or didn't directly do, but, rather, for the fact that he "knew or should have known" that his Chief Compliance Officer and AML Compliance Officer were not performing their respective compliance jobs. It's a bit of a dicey proposition for FINRA to simply posit a President's liability upon an Exit Report, as those are frequently contentious affairs (that is the Staff's allegations and the firm's responses).  Moreover, if the exit reports merely cite "concerns" but do not elevate those to formal charges, then it's questionable as to what the firm's President should do.  Again, we need to keep in mind that The CCO and AMLCO were hired to do their jobs -- those jobs were not to be done by the President, who has other responsibilities.  It's one thing for a President to "know" of the malfeasance or nonfeasance of his compliance officers, and such knowledge should compel prompt action.  However, when a regulator says that a President "should have known" of compliance officers misconduct but the main proof is that he/she was on notice per an exit report, well, I'm not convinced that such a predicate is sufficient. 

As with all regulatory matters, this case may well be "fact specific," and the details of what the President knew may be fare more extensive than what's presented in FINRA's monthly squib.  Of course, I'd like to see the exit reports for major firms, and then I would like to see whether FINRA will hold the presidents of such members to the same standards.

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